®
Iraq Intel/InfoOps Assessment &
Summary of Joint Lessons Learned
Robert David Steele
Updated 24 October 2003
®
Seven Generations of War
Evolutionary Eras
1st Generation
2nd Generation
3rd Generation
4th Generation
5th Generation
6th Generation
7th Generation
Linch Pin
Low Tech Mass
New Tech
New Doctrine
Non-State
RMA (C4I)
RIA (IO/Intel)
RGA
Means of Winning
Attrition
Attrition
Maneuver
Asymmetry
Precision Weapons
Precision Intel(!!)
Everything,
Always
®
Definitions
Intelligence
Information Operations
• JCS: product
• JCS: knowledge
• CIA: knowledge and
foreknowledge as prelude
to decision and action
(covert action silent)
• OSS: global coverage, all
sources, all languages,
24/7, NRT analysis at all
times
1. Electronic Warfare (EW)
2. Operations Security (OPSEC)
3. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)
4. Military Deception
5. Computer Network Ops (CNO).
6. Supporting InfoAssurance
– Counter Intelligence
– Physical Security
– Physical Attack
7. Intelligence
8. Public Affairs/Civil Affairs
9. Public Diplomacy & Assistance
®
Seven Generations of Intelligence/IO
Evolutionary Eras
1st Generation
2nd Generation
3rd Generation
4th Generation
5th Generation
6th Generation
7th Generation
What Do We Need to Know
Easy: Where is the army?
Easy: Where are the trenches?
Moderate: How many with what?
Hard: Watch every non-state actor.
Hard: Watch everything on the fly.
Hard: Make sense of billions of bits.
Very Hard: 24/7, 29+ languages and
get your own house in order.
®
US/Allied Intelligence in Iraq
Successes
• Good last
minute
exiles sent
in with
money and
forged
documents
to recruit
and observe
Failures
• No deep clandestine assets
• No new nor firm knowledge on WMD
• Intel vacuum allowed WH adventurism
• Did not locate Saddaam
• Could not keep up with battle forces
• Unable to do guerilla/urban intelligence
• No peace/reconstruction intelligence
• (Note: the US corruption is *amazing*)
®
US/Allied InfoOps in Iraq
Successes
• Saved the
Oil Fields
• Inspired
desertions
& no fires
• Kept most
civilians
out of
fight
Failures
• Sunglasses & armor--aid as PSYOP
• Girls forced to urinate publicly (rdblks)
• Saddam as Elvis (cowboy IO)
• Poor impact on Arabs (bye to Al J.)
• Poor impact on Europe (bye to Old E.)
• Ignored non-Arab Muslims world-wide
(Central Asia, South Asia, India,
Pakistan, Muslim Africa)
®
Net Assessment of Iraq Intel/IO
Bottom line: Intel/IO had no
coherent strategy, conflicting
or absent capabilities and
messages, earns a 3 out of a
possible 7 on the continuum.
F
F
F
F
D
C
B
D
Reconstruction intel
Post-war Guerilla intel
Global IO Images
Covert Ops Options
WMD actual status
Battle damage
Kick-off OOB
Congressional debate
Note: Policy decisions can be said to have handicapped intelligence.
®
Joint Lessons Learned I
• Did great, need to
sustain and improve:
– Joint Integration and
Adaptive Planning
– Joint Force Synergy
– Special Operations
Forces and SOFConventional Force
Integration
– Mission rehearsal
®
Joint Lessons Learned II
• Did good, but need
enhancement
– Urban Operations
– Information Operations
– Intelligence,
Surveillance, &
Reconaissance
•
•
•
•
enemy perspective
tactical bandwidth
proper dissemination
analytic toolkits
®
Joint Lessons Learned III
• Fell short, need work:
– Battle Damage
Assessment
– Fratricide (Friendly ID)
– Deployment Planning
and Execution
– Reserve Mobilization
– Coalition Information
Sharing
®
Joint Lessons Learned IV
• Lower Tier Issues
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Joint Fires
Time Sensitive Targeting
Overmatching Strike
Training
Theater Logistics
Public Affairs/Media Integration
Shaping Interagency Involvement
EUCOM/CENTCOM Seam
®
Joint Lessons Learned V
• Insights to future
concepts
– Emerging Battlespace
– Knowledge-Enabled
Warfare
– Effects-Based
Operations
• NOT MENTIONED:
– Iraqi incompetency.
Descargar

No Slide Title