® Iraq Intel/InfoOps Assessment & Summary of Joint Lessons Learned Robert David Steele Updated 24 October 2003 ® Seven Generations of War Evolutionary Eras 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 4th Generation 5th Generation 6th Generation 7th Generation Linch Pin Low Tech Mass New Tech New Doctrine Non-State RMA (C4I) RIA (IO/Intel) RGA Means of Winning Attrition Attrition Maneuver Asymmetry Precision Weapons Precision Intel(!!) Everything, Always ® Definitions Intelligence Information Operations • JCS: product • JCS: knowledge • CIA: knowledge and foreknowledge as prelude to decision and action (covert action silent) • OSS: global coverage, all sources, all languages, 24/7, NRT analysis at all times 1. Electronic Warfare (EW) 2. Operations Security (OPSEC) 3. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) 4. Military Deception 5. Computer Network Ops (CNO). 6. Supporting InfoAssurance – Counter Intelligence – Physical Security – Physical Attack 7. Intelligence 8. Public Affairs/Civil Affairs 9. Public Diplomacy & Assistance ® Seven Generations of Intelligence/IO Evolutionary Eras 1st Generation 2nd Generation 3rd Generation 4th Generation 5th Generation 6th Generation 7th Generation What Do We Need to Know Easy: Where is the army? Easy: Where are the trenches? Moderate: How many with what? Hard: Watch every non-state actor. Hard: Watch everything on the fly. Hard: Make sense of billions of bits. Very Hard: 24/7, 29+ languages and get your own house in order. ® US/Allied Intelligence in Iraq Successes • Good last minute exiles sent in with money and forged documents to recruit and observe Failures • No deep clandestine assets • No new nor firm knowledge on WMD • Intel vacuum allowed WH adventurism • Did not locate Saddaam • Could not keep up with battle forces • Unable to do guerilla/urban intelligence • No peace/reconstruction intelligence • (Note: the US corruption is *amazing*) ® US/Allied InfoOps in Iraq Successes • Saved the Oil Fields • Inspired desertions & no fires • Kept most civilians out of fight Failures • Sunglasses & armor--aid as PSYOP • Girls forced to urinate publicly (rdblks) • Saddam as Elvis (cowboy IO) • Poor impact on Arabs (bye to Al J.) • Poor impact on Europe (bye to Old E.) • Ignored non-Arab Muslims world-wide (Central Asia, South Asia, India, Pakistan, Muslim Africa) ® Net Assessment of Iraq Intel/IO Bottom line: Intel/IO had no coherent strategy, conflicting or absent capabilities and messages, earns a 3 out of a possible 7 on the continuum. F F F F D C B D Reconstruction intel Post-war Guerilla intel Global IO Images Covert Ops Options WMD actual status Battle damage Kick-off OOB Congressional debate Note: Policy decisions can be said to have handicapped intelligence. ® Joint Lessons Learned I • Did great, need to sustain and improve: – Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning – Joint Force Synergy – Special Operations Forces and SOFConventional Force Integration – Mission rehearsal ® Joint Lessons Learned II • Did good, but need enhancement – Urban Operations – Information Operations – Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconaissance • • • • enemy perspective tactical bandwidth proper dissemination analytic toolkits ® Joint Lessons Learned III • Fell short, need work: – Battle Damage Assessment – Fratricide (Friendly ID) – Deployment Planning and Execution – Reserve Mobilization – Coalition Information Sharing ® Joint Lessons Learned IV • Lower Tier Issues – – – – – – – – Joint Fires Time Sensitive Targeting Overmatching Strike Training Theater Logistics Public Affairs/Media Integration Shaping Interagency Involvement EUCOM/CENTCOM Seam ® Joint Lessons Learned V • Insights to future concepts – Emerging Battlespace – Knowledge-Enabled Warfare – Effects-Based Operations • NOT MENTIONED: – Iraqi incompetency.