Gesture and language:
Iconicity and viewpoint
Eve Sweetser
Dept. of Linguistics
University of California, Berkeley
[email protected]
CogSci Faculty Retreat, Dec. 7, 2007
Gesture is a universal
People gesture when they speak. In every culture.
Gesture is minutely co-timed with speech production in what
is clearly a common neural production package.
(McNeill, Hand and Mind)
What varies:
Size of gesture space
Precise pattern of co-timing of speech and gesture
(This takes a lot of learning! Cf. McNeill,
Goldin-Meadow)
Conventional “emblems”
How much of a gesture is
“meaningful” - and to whom?
Speakers gesture in absence of physical interlocutor
seeing the gestures. (on the telephone, for example)
Speakers’ lexical access is impeded by impeding gesture especially lexical access to spatial vocabulary.
Speakers gesture LESS without physical interlocutor:
in particular, INTERACTIVE gestures are diminished.
(Bavelas et al.)
(Though nods and head-shakes may persist!)
“Content” gestures are still there.
Speakers alter gestural patterns to take addressees into
account (Özyurek 2000).
Gesture structure
Gestures have prosodic structure like speech.
A linguistic PHRASE often coincides with a single
GESTURE, therefore called a gestural “phrase”
by some (Kendon).
A linguistic phrase has various stages including:
a preparatory phase
possibly a pre-stroke “hold”
a STROKE (the major motion phase of a gesture,
often temporally associated with some
specific constituent of the linguistic phrase,
in English often the VERB)
a post-stroke hold
retraction
Intermodal meaning overlap
Gestural “phrases” are temporally associated with
linguistic forms whose meaning is related to theirs.
Gesture can add information not present in the linguistic form.
It can also give “interactional” meaning about how to take the
linguistic content.
And it can contradict (and win out over) linguistic information
in the listener/viewer’s interpretation.
HOW and WHY does gesture accompany language this way?
Attentional focus is one aspect of the interaction Mischa will talk about that.
Things to notice in “Listen”
The use of the INTER-SPEAKER space: the floor is
gained by reaching gesturally into the space
between the two speakers’ spaces - and even
into the interlocutor’s space.
The use of the “unclaimed” adjacent space: the
|cupboard| could NOT just as well be in
between the interlocutors, but the |stacking|
can be done in the speaker’s own gesture
space.
Listen
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Listen transcript
S1: …the underside.
S2: OK, this is what would happen.
S1: You’d stack dishes.
S2: Listen.
We did stack dishes
buut
I’d like reach in to get a plate
to get ready to eat
and there’d be like [greaS1: [laughs]
S2: - there’d be like grease on the bottom]
S1: yeah
S2: And I’d be like…
Listen transcript
S1 mimes washing the underside of the dishes as she says “the
underside,” then shapes a stack of plates (or makes a stacking gesture)
as she says “you’d stack dishes.”
S2 is meanwhile trying to break into S1’s high-involvement feedback,
which is keeping her from the floor. She first says, “OK, this is what
would happen,” with hands shaping a new topic in her own gesture
space, which return to rest as she fails to get the floor. She then tries
again with “Listen” - accompanying her attempt with three left-hand
D-points (on “listen”, “did” and “buut”), which reach well out of her
own space into the shared interactional gesture space. She gains the
floor.
Listen
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Iconicity
ICONICITY: a representation is iconic if the form in some way
resembles the meaning. Spoken language examples:
(1) phonosymbolism: meow, crash, pop.
(2) She talked on and on and on.
But (cf. Taub, Language from the Body) the VISUAL-GESTURAL
medium allows for a greater variety of effective iconic
mechanisms than the auditory one.
Signed languages therefore share this extra-iconic character with
gesture, although they are conventional in ways that
Visual-gestural iconicity
Iconic mappings (thanks to S. Taub)
ASL TREE iconically represents a schematic concept
of a tree.
DH FOREARM = TRUNK
DH HAND & FINGERS = BRANCHES
(note: doesn’t mean a tree with 5 branches!)
NDH FOREARM = GROUND
Upper arms, signer’s head & trunk: NOT MAPPED
How conventional is gesture?
There are cultural and crosscultural regularities in
how people gesture about both concrete and
abstract domains.
(Metaphor and iconicity can be conventional,
we know; and culture-specific. HKSL “Tree”
vs. ASL “Tree.”
Local “catchments” (cf. McNeill and Duncan, in McNeill
(2000)) regularly arise in interaction. Just as local
repeated phrasings do. Reduced forms of these
catchments still carry meaning. (cf. Also LeBaron
and Streeck.
McNeill’s Snow White experiment.
Iconic gestures can then be
interpreted metaphorically
Gesture forwards - does that mean physically ahead of me,
or in the future?
Rotation of hand - does that mean some physical object is rotating,
or does it show repetitive or ongoing aspect of an action?
Hand up, palm out - is the speaker trying to prevent the addressee
from approaching her (or fend off a projectile), or is she
metaphorically “fending off” questions
Cf. Parrill and Sweetser 2004.
Metaphor
All languages use METAPHOR, because all cultures have
metaphoric cognitive patterns.
One way of looking at metaphor: understanding more abstract
things in terms of more concrete things.
TIME IS SPACE
FUTURE IS IN FRONT OF EGO
PAST IS BEHIND EGO
last year is behind us; look ahead to next year
Source and target domains
Metaphoric gestures are iconic for
the SOURCE domain of the
metaphoric mapping.
Gesture forwards for future: FUTURE IS AHEAD.
Hand up, palm out to forestall questions: IDEAS ARE OBJECTS,
COMMUNICATION IS OBJECT EXCHANGE…
Palm-up “offering” hand, meaning “it’s obvious”, or “now
I’m sure you see”: Again, COMMUNICATION IS
OBJECT EXCHANGE.
“Put you away” iconic mappings
2 B hands, palms facing each other (thumb side up) =
The hands of someone putting something away.
Motion of the gesturer’s hands = Motion of the hands
putting something away.
Space between gesturer’s hands = object being put away (box?)
(Invisible surrogate! Moves when hands do.)
“Put you away”
metaphoric mappings
CONVICTED CRIMINAL = AN OBJECT (a box?)
PUTTING CRIMINAL IN PRISON = PUTTING THE OBJECT
AWAY
AGENT PUTTING CRIMINAL IN PRISON = AGENT
PUTTING THE OBJECT AWAY
RESULTING STATUS OF CRIMINAL (STUCK IN ONE
PLACE, MONITORED) = RESULTING STATUS OF
OBJECT (WHEN PUT AWAY, WE KNOW WHERE
TO FIND IT AND WE DON’T THINK IT WILL GET
LOST).
Sign language examples
TOMORROW, YESTERDAY
KNOW, IDEA
VOTE, TEABAG
DIPLOMA
DRIVE, FLY(PLANE)
NEPHEW, NIECE, COUSIN
Things to note in “concepts”
Setting up of two spatial areas, |concepts| and
|forms|.
Mapping between them.
The encircling gestures for “framework.”
Concepts
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Transcript of “concepts”
Clip name: concepts map onto the world
(lecture by Mark Johnson)
...have fixed definitions
and they map onto the world...um...
and that knowledge consists in...framing a set of concepts
that neatly map onto states of affairs in the world
whether those states of affairs have to do with morality
or politics or um...or um...quantum physics or whatever.
Gesture transpript of “concepts”
Clip name: concepts map onto the world
(lecture by Mark Johnson)
Two B hands to Left, delineate a definition/concept space.
They then move to the Right and delineate a World space.
Delineation of a globe-shaped central space is |framing
a set of concepts|.
Moving hands from one side to the other is |mapping|
Handwaving shows “it doesn’t matter” at the discourse
level (cf. whatever)
Concepts
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Viewpoint, language and body
Language is basically, intrinsically viewpointed.
Cognition is basically, intrinsically viewpointed.
(BECAUSE)
The body is basically, intrinsically viewpointed.
Implications
Cognition could not be genuinely independent of bodily
experience, and language could not be independent
of (embodied) cognition.
The surprising thing would be if we did NOT exploit our
constant use of irrealis space understandings for other
less obviously or immediately “functional” purposes.
It would also be really surprising if fictional characters
and situations lacked viewpoint.
Linguistic viewpoint
Message in a bottle: Meet me here tomorrow.
Deictic marking (e.g., here/there, this/that) is pervasive
in human language. In a physical scene it marks
speaker’s physical viewpoint.
BUT: cf. Rubba 1986, or Hanks 1990: a distal deictic can
just as well mean social non-identification.
This cooking-fire can mean the one I cook on,
while that cooking fire can mean the one I don’t
get to cook on. This part of town can mean my
part of town, and that kind of neighborhood
can mean the kind I lack an ethnic affiliation with.
Linguistic viewpoint 2
First, second and third person seem to be linguistic
universals: I, You, Other = Speaker, Addressee,
Third Party. No big surprise, since in actual
communication, these distinctions are inevitable.
BUT (Rubba 1986) there are differences between so-called
“impersonal” uses of English 2nd-person you and
3rd-person one or they. You shows more identification
of the speaker with the referent, even though all the
referents are third-person.
Linguistic viewpoint markers 1
All the different ways that content is presented and construed
differently depending on (among other things!):
Where the Speaker and Addressee are assumed to be, and what they
be able to see, be able to reach, etc. (The Real Space.)
here, there, this, that, next door, ….
When S and A are assumed to be: now, then, tomorrow, last year…
What an imagined participant can see, reach, etc., from an
imagined location in some imagined space.
What the Speaker and Addressee are assumed to know, think,
presuppose, and be able to calculate mentally about whatever
mental space is involved. The/a, if/when/since, choice of
formal/informal pronouns, presuppositional verbs like
stop,...
Linguistic viewpoint markers 2
What the Speaker and Addressee feel about the contents of the
relevant spaces - how they evaluate them affectively,
culturally, etc. Thrifty/stingy, maybe, hopefully,….
And what imagined participants know, think, presuppose, calculate,
feel, etc. about relevant spaces.
(And more, including possession, social identification and
differentiation, ….)
In short, language seems affected by just about anything about the
way that a particular individual’s mental space construal is
specific to that individual’s cognitive and perceptual access.
What is “viewpoint”?
Literal origo of visual access and perspective.
Social “viewpoint”
Literary “viewpoint”
Cognitive “viewpoint”
We co-experience:
Our physical visual perspective on events
Our self-location and definition of peripersonal space
Our tactile and other sensory access to the situation
Our cognitive assessment of the situation
Our emotional reaction to the situation
Video systems may give us multiple simultaneous visual
perspectives on the same event; but normally all we get is
one: our own.
The asymmetric Self
Front-back:
Asymmetric physical access, manual affordances
Asymmetric visual access
Asymmetric movement affordances
Up-down:
We have no experience of life outside an asymmetric gravitic
field. Motion, vision, etc are all affected by this.
Left-right:
Dominant/non-dominant hand; asymmetric manual affordances
Relative spatial languages vs. absolute spatial languages.
Inherent and transferred asymmetry of non-human entities.
What is viewpoint, cont.
Asymmetries in visual access correlate with asymmetries in:
Informational access attendant on visual access
Physical access to object manipulation
Motion affordances
This complex set of correlations with located visual viewpoint
also correlate with evaluative differences in assessing the
situation.
The kid with the plate of cookies in front of her, as
opposed to the one who doesn’t, not only
has different visual, tactile, etc., access, but a reason
to plan differently, make different inferences,
and experience the situation differently from an
emotional viewpoint.
Why these belong together
What the evidence seems to show is that children from the start
react differently to humans vs. nonhumans and animates vs.
inanimates, even though they only gradually develop
the adult concepts of human-ness and animacy.
Relatively early shared attention loci, attention to direction of
caregiver’s eye-gaze.
Even at early stages of language-learning, children show considerable
interactional ability to cope with the fact that caregivers may
disapprove of their actions or try to thwart them, and versatile
mechanisms for getting approval.
They also request information and transmit it.
Levels of theory of mind
Moreover, meta-awareness of even some of the basic perceptual
aspects of differentiation develops slowly. Small children
clearly understand that they can’t see or know everything
their parents see or know - they ask questions expecting the
caregiver to know more than they do, and they ask to be picked
up to get a better view, as they know the grownup is getting one.
BUT they tend to think that interlocutors (esp. adults??)
not only know but actually see everything they do.
They point and say “this” and “that” when speaking on the
telephone, or to a caregiver who can’t see the object in question.
Levels of theory of mind 2
A late stage in all this is the acquisition of a conscious meta-awareness
that other people have MINDS whose STATES may be
DIFFERENT from theirs: other people may know or believe
different things from what they know and believe (Wimmer,
Perner, Tomasello,….), and people may feel differently about
the same stimuli. (E.g. celery and goldfish crackers - cf.
Gopnik.)
Incomplete shared viewpoint
The ability to “put yourself in someone else’s position” cognitively
and emotionally is one that adults never fully learn (if they did,
one supposes they would essentially have “out-of-body
experiences” in other people’s situations).
Incomplete shared viewpoint 2
BUT humans can’t unlearn or do without such viewpoint sharing.
We can’t help having physical and emotional responses to film images
of humans involved in eating, crying, laughing, kissing, or
hitting each other.
Reading a newspaper story about strangers who have lost their jobs, or
can’t get ex-husbands to pay child support, or have overcome
odds to win a sports event - these things, to a greater or lesser
degree, put us in sympathy with the participants’ viewpoints.
Inasmuch as we are considerate of others in daily life, much
of our consideration derives not just from “following the rules”
but from being able to imagine “how the other person would
feel” if we did the opposite.
Local and global coherence
All primates appear to have mirror neuron circuits which (at least
for certain aspects of physical interaction and spatial
relations) are activated both by the Self’s motions of
hand, mouth, foot and the Self’s peripersonal space, and by
an observed primate’s actions and spatial relations.
The ability to maintain local coherence between differing viewpoints
apparently follows from our physical perceptions of motion,
space, etc, including mirror neurons; NOTE, we do not have
trouble tracking which things are in our interlocutor’s field
of vision, even though it may be very different from ours.
This is a plausible basis on which to build later higher-level
awareness of different viewpoints as parts of a coherent
larger scene.
Other people’s viewpoints
Add to this a basic experience of INTERACTION with another
human with viewpoint (babies interact with care-givers actively
from the start). A contrast between SPEAKER and
ADDRESSEE - or more generally between a communicatively
expressive agent and the intended interpreting observer - is thus
another deeply entrenched experiential correlation. From the
start, we experience ourselves in BOTH of these two roles.
And, thanks to our understanding that everyone has Viewpoint,
Viewpoint blends freely with either the Speaker or the Hearer
role in the Speaker-Hearer contrast.
Adult cognition requires that speakers:
(1) Have the experiential correlations involved
in having a Viewpoint “from the inside”.
(2) Project that kind of experiential correlation of
Viewpoint onto other people, assuming that they also
have that kind of perspectival experience of the world.
(3) meta-navigate this system - be able to go back and forth
between representing one viewpoint and another, and
know when/whether our language requires or allows
particular viewpoint representations of situations.
(May S, or must S, say “I’d love to come to your
party” rather than using go?)
(4) also have some natural representation of global, less
viewpointed knowledge (e.g. spatial knowledge)
(5) be able to represent many situations linguistically in
“global” as well as in “participant” viewpoints.
Adult cognition requires that speakers
also:
(6) Project much of their systematic spatiomotor “viewpoint”
structure onto other understanding of less concrete
domains such as Time, social relations, cognition,
selfhood.
(7) Maintain more and less perspectival models of these
domains as well, and know when to use language which
shows the appropriate perspectival construal.
(8) Be able to TAKE APART viewpoint blends, maintaining
personal “I”ness and “you” ness separate from (for
example) a proximal/distal structure, and use linguistic
forms appropriate to this dissection.
vs.: "Please
come to my party."
H: "you"
S: "I"
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Input 1: S/H space
with EGO at Speaker
Input 2: deictic
coordinate space
H: "you"
S: "I"
H: "you"
S: "I"
Blend: "Can
I come to
your party?"
Experiential basis of deixis
Most languages seem to have at least a two-way distinction between
this and that, here and there.
Some have more complex three-way distinctions (here, there, yonder).
(1) Basis in Speaker’s visual field and manual access field:
Here = within S’s manual access range
There = within the visual field but outside manual access range
Yonder = outside both visual field and manual access field.
In a two-term system, the manual access field
would be the central sense of here, the area outside the manual
access and vision fields would be unmistakably there, and the area
of the visual field beyond manual access would be negotiable,
depending on what objects were being contrasted.
Experiential basis of deixis, 2
(2) Basis in the Speaker/Hearer contrast:
Here = near S
There = near H
Yon = away from both. (Once again, in a two-term
system, things get fuzzy.)
This is not necessarily in opposition to the analysis in terms of S’s
different fields of access; we might expect that in a prototypical
communicative exchange, S and H will be within visual range
of each other, and that there may very possibly be more overlap
between their visual fields than between their fields of manual
access.
So “near H” (or “nearer to H than to S”) might well also refer to a
location beyond S’s manual access, but inside S’s visual field.
Problems with the spatial view
of deixis
(1) It doesn’t, on its own, explain systematic extensions to time,
or the independent system of temporal deixis; more on this soon!
(2) It doesn’t explain all the SOCIAL, non-spatial uses of deixis.
(cf. Rubba 1996, Hanks Referential Practice).
(3) It doesn’t explain language-specific spatial uses (is the “this”
term or the “that” term, the “come” verb or the “go” verb,
the unmarked member of the pair, for example?)
A combination of problems (2) and (3) can be noted in French:
Professeur Jones n’est pas ici. (She works at UCLA, not at UCB))
Professeur Jones n’est pas là. (She is not at her desk just now)
Metaphoric viewpoint spaces
Social uses of here/there, this/that can readily be seen as FURTHER
blends, between physical space and social space.
This should be seen as coherent with the very general
metaphorical spatialization of our concepts of Self and social
structure.
SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP IS PHYSICAL CLOSENESS
SOCIAL ALIENATION IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE
Displaced deixis
The speaker's body is one of our most basic landmarks for
understanding whatever she says.
It is because bodily viewpoint infuses our cognitive and
interactional structure that deixis and perspective are
so pervasively manifested in language.
Yet actual here-and-now bodily viewpoint is very flexibly
displaced to represent other imagined ones; we don't
really know the meaning of here or the reference of a
pointing gesture unless we know whether, for example,
the speaker is enacting some irrealis situation .
Such displacement phenomena are present equally in
language and gesture, and in spoken and signed
languages.
They can usefully be analyzed as blends of the here-and-now
deictic space with an imagined one.
Real-space viewpoint blends
The visual/gestural modality uses S’s body to represent (among other
things!):
- itself, at other times and places
- other human bodies and animal bodies
Every representation of a body brings with it the physical
asymmetries of affordance and sensory access which are
characteristic of bodies: in other words,
VIEWPOINT can represent VIEWPOINT
DEICTIC CENTER can represent DEICTIC CENTER.
BODILY AFFORDANCES can represent
BODILY AFFORDANCES
This is crucial to the ways in which gesture can represent social and
abstract concepts.
Displaced gestural deixis
Displacement of deictic centers occurs in gesture as well as in language.
cf. Haviland’s work, esp. Haviland 2000.
“Simple” spatial points are anything but simple.
The “same” pointing gesture used by a Mayan compadre
of Haviland to refer first to the direction in which
he would find the ruins if he went to the town of
Palenque (pointing AS IF FROM a location in
the distant town), and to refer to the direction from
the speech location to a local landmark.
(Palenque is in the opposite direction from the
speech location.)
Pointing is INDEXICAL rather than iconic? Or both?
Secondary iconicity
Very saliently, a set of deep metaphoric mappings based in
the spatial source domain allow what I refer to as “secondary iconicity”
effects in the visual/gestural domain.
These are crucially mappings of one deictically centered domain onto
another, which is why they are naturally and saliently
representable in the visual/gestural modality.
One obvious and complex example is TIME IS SPACE.
Gesture, like most signed languages, normally and conventionally
uses body-centered spatial deixis to represent
“now”-centered temporal deixis.
FUTURE = FORWARDS, PAST = BACK
(contrast with sideways “time line”)
This is so “natural” that the connection is nearly as strong as
any direct iconic mapping.
Spatiotemporal metaphors
and experiential bases
(cf. Moore 2000, Nuñez and Sweetser 2001 & forthcoming)
(1) The experience of moving along a path, and encountering
one location after another.
Linear mapping of locations to times;
inferential structure is parallel.
Past, already-encountered locations are behind Ego;
Future, yet-to-be-seen locations are in front of Ego.
(2) The experience of standing and looking in front of Ego.
Asymmetry: can see in front of self, not in back.
(Therefore can know what’s happening in front.)
Corresponding temporal asmmetry: can know past
events, not future ones.
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I'm going to discuss deixis.
profiled time
"I" (subjective experience
center) and
deictic "viewpoint" center
Going to
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Coming to
I'm coming to appreciate John's sense of humor.
"I", Center of
subjective experience
time profiled and
deictic "viewpoint"
center
(cf. Michele Emanatian 1992, Chagga 'come' and 'go': Metaphor
and the development of tense-aspect.
Studies in Language
16:1, 1-33.)
Nayra mara
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Nayra mara
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Deictic references
Reference to current physical speech-act setting:
Speaker points to a present object in the room.
Speaker points to her own body, meaning to refer to herself.
Blends already present: content and physical setting!
(e.g. Points at an object: “What is wrong with that?”
gesture identifies entity in world AS part of content)
Abstract described deixis
English speaker gestures backwards when referring to long ago...
A more complex blend: a French speaker says
C’était bien avant (“it was well before (that time),
i.e., earlier”), and gestures backwards.
The speech here metaphorically sets up a
moving-time structure, while the gesture seems to
refer to an ego-centered (past is back,
future is ahead) metaphorical mapping.
An Aymara speaker says nayra (“long ago”) and gestures
forwards. (Nuñez)
Prevalence of deictically centered (“Egocentric”) models of
time in gesture. (What would this be like in an “absolute”
spatial language?)
Long and short range
Speaker discusses planning, long-range and short-range.
Speaker’s body is the center from which relative
futurity from a hypothetical present is
calculated.
Speaker compares two topics or gives two viewpoints:
Speaker’s dominant hand’s space represents the
central topic or the speaker’s viewpoint,
while the non-dominant hand represents
the contrasting topic or viewpoint.
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Dynamic programming
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Dynamic programming
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chess
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chess
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Mental book-keeping
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Mental book-keeping
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Stop and take questions
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Stop and take questions
Generalizations: more than one direction away from the center.
SIDES:
Dominant vs. non-dominant:
Trajector vs. landmark
Main topic vs. secondary topic
Speaker’s views vs. contrasting views
UP/DOWN
Up or down vs. level:
“normative” place on scale is on speaker’s gesture-space
level
(A speaker identifying with embodiment places “reality”
on level, and “abstract ideas” on a higher level
opposite his face.)
Motion and event structure:
Event trajectories start near speaker, move towards farther
away. (The start is a baseline; Ego is a baseline.)
Aspect: (cf. Duncan)
Mapping of aspectual structure from gesture to represented
activity, etc.
Query: how “global” can gesture ever be? There’s always
perspective, even if Ego isn’t mapped onto some
represented entity.
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In gesture, discourse and temporal deictic spaces are not only
conceived spatially (as they are pervasively in spoken
language), they are actually enacted in Real Space.
The same is true of signed language. (One more reason why
Sign Linguistics needs to incorporate viewpoint from
the ground up, as Liddell and others have argued.)
Enactment of other spaces in Real Space, or use of deictically
centered words with displaced senses in spoken
language, need not of course diminish the cognitive and
perceptual priority of Real Space. It is precisely their
dependence on Real Space which gives discourse and
social and temporal spatial uses their cognitive
power
and flexibility.
Conclusions:
The physical viewpoint of the speaker is highly polysemous in gesture,
and in some very conventional ways.
It represents much of the range of phenomena which linguists and
literary analysts and speakers have referred to by the label
“viewpoint” metaphorically.
It does so systematically, in ways that parallel linguistic metaphor,
but are directly embodied as spoken-language metaphor is not.
No surprise that novelists use descriptions of physical situations
from some specific physical vantage point, as well as
evaluative and descriptive and deictic and other aspects of
language, to show “character viewpoint.”
Written language is a very strange medium.
In principle, it needs to step back from “meet me here tomorrow”
and give information that is less situated and more explicit.
In fact, the very same issues permeate written language at the
next level down.
Joey sat quietly. (is this an onlooking teacher’s viewpoint?)
Daddy would come soon to pick him up. Everything would be all
right then. (cf. Banfield)
The police spent the morning trying to locate the kidnapped
child, but they could not find her. Finally they received
a telephone call. A man had spotted a small girl in a
park. The kidnappers had apparently released her.
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References
Cienki, Alan. 1998. Metaphoric gestures and some of their
relations to verbal metaphoric expressions.
In Discourse and Cognition, ed. J-P Koenig, 189-204.
Stanford CA: CSLI Publications.
Hanks, William. 1990. Referential Practice: Language and lived
space among the Maya. University of Chicago Press.
Haviland, John. 2000. Pointing, gesture spaces and mental maps. In
McNeill (2000), pp. 13-46.
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