International Maritime
Security Network, LLC.
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Section 1
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Please remember to:
• Put cell phones on vibrate
• If you need to leave, please do so
• If you are tired please feel free to
• Help yourself to coffee and snacks
at any time.
• Bathrooms and fire exits are:
• Please tell us a little about yourself
– Where are you from?
– What part of the Maritime industry do
you work in?
– How long have you been working in
this industry?
• What do you hope to get out of this
Course Overview
• Provide Knowledge required for both CSO
(Company Security Officer) & VSO (Vessel
Security Officer) to perform their duties in
accordance with;
• Amendment to the Annex to the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS), 1974 as amended and;
• IMO’s (International Maritime Organization)
ISPS Code parts A & B
• Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)
and 33 CFR, Subchapter H—Maritime Security
Competencies to be achieved
• See Handout (1)
– Company Security Officer
– Vessel Security Officer
Historical Prospective
Terrorism and the
Maritime Domain
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Why are we here?
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
The FBI defines terrorism as
“The unlawful use of force or
violence against persons or property
to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population,
or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social
Maritime Terrorism
“Any person or group, acting outside
the jurisdiction of a sovereign state,
for a political motive, who (i)
executes or plots to execute an
attack against a ship, port facility or
offshore facility or (ii) attempts to
further their political motives by
utilizing elements in the maritime
environment to execute an act of
The differences between guerrilla
warfare and terrorism
Defining Terrorism
Guerrilla Warfare
Purposeful targeting of
Military personnel and
installations in order to
achieve a political goal
Freedom Fighters
Purposeful targeting of
Civilians in order to achieve a
political goal
USS Cole on 12-Oct-00 was
attacked by 2 suicide bombers.
17 Sailors where killed
39 Sailors where injured
By Al Qaeda
The Seaborne
5 – Nov - 05
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Muhammad Abu Abbas, Oct 7th, 1985 four
PLF militants seized the “Achille-lauro”.
These terrorist killed Leon Klinghoffer, an
elderly, wheelchair bound, Jewish man,
and threatened to blow up the ship. All of
this was in effort to negotiate the release
of 50 Palestine prisoners.
The Tamil Tigers
The most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka, founded in 1976.
Uses overt and illegal methods to raise funds, acquire weapons,
and publicize its cause of establishing an independent Tamil
state. Began its armed conflict with the Sri Lankan Government
in 1983 and relies on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of
terrorist tactics.
The Tamil Tigers
The world's largest unregistered navy with approximately 10,000
armed combatants in Sri Lanka; about 3,000 to 6,000 form a
trained cadre of fighters. The LTTE also has a significant overseas
support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and
propaganda activities.
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Smallest and most radical of the Islamic separatist groups
operating in the southern Philippines. Split from the Moro National
Liberation Front in 1991 under the leadership of Abdurajik
Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine
police on 18 December 1998.
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Activities: Uses bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, and
extortion payments to promote an independent Islamic state in
western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, areas in the
southern Philippines.
The attack of the “Limburg”
• Happened 2002 in Yemen
• Attack was done by Al Qaeda
• Same type of attack as the Cole
• Established in 1964 as a ruralbased, pro-Soviet guerrilla army.
• Has been anti-United States since
its inception.
• Located in Columba
Attacks of 9-11
Current security
threats & patterns
What’s going on today
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Potential maritime targets
LNG tankers
Nuclear waste carriers
Oil Tankers
Cargo ships
OSC Platforms
Maritime Transportation Threats
Piracy and armed attacks
Contraband smuggling
Stowaways and refugees
Cargo theft
Collateral damage
Could it be terrorism?
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Piracy defined:
• Shipping robbery on the high seas,
especially the stealing of a ship’s
• Air the hijacking of an aircraft or
another form of transportation
transport robbery committed on
board any form of transportation,
especially an aircraft.
• Murder on the high seas
Piracy is worldwide
One of the worlds hot spots
Straits of Malacca
The Straits of Gibraltar
Morocco & Tangiers
Reporting Piracy
• The Regional Piracy Centre
– Receives and distributes information
– Collates and analyzes information and
issues consolidated reporting to relevant
– Gives guidance on what ship owners and
ships operators can do to
prevent/suppress acts of piracy
– Assists owners and crews of ships that
have been attacked
– Locates vessels that have been seized by
pirates and recovers stolen cargoes
– Check out
The Goals of a Terrorists
Invoke fear and panic
Gain attention both politically and spiritually
Change the world to their religious beliefs
Rid the world of opposing beliefs.
To gain recognition for their cause
Terrorist Patterns
• Use military type of development
and deployment:
– Terrorist will pick a target to attack that
they feel has a good chance of
– Reconnaissance of the planned target.
– Funding and recruiting.
– Planning and testing.
– Execution and hopeful success.
Current Security Threats and
Example: Osama Bin Laden & AlQaeda used U.S. training, U.S.
people, U.S. equipment & fuel to kill
thousands of people from all over he
world. And as you can see, it
worked well.
Ship & Port operations
and conditions
The Intermodal System
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Intermodal; “Door to Door”
Intermodal; “Door to Door”
Most everything in your home came to
your doorstep by way of ship.
Intermodal scenario
• Container is loaded in
• It has your cargo and the
cargo of 10 others inside
of it.
• It is placed on a truck
and sent to a port facility
• It is loaded into a ship
• Ship crosses ocean and
lands in Long Beach,
California, U.S.A.
• It is off loaded and placed
in a holding area
• It is then either loaded
onto a railcar or truck
• The truck takes the
container to St. Louis MO.
to a distribution center.
• It is opened and your
cargo is placed onto
another smaller truck or
• Smaller truck brings it
right to your door.
• So many hands and still
so EZ to slip something
through the system
Ship and facility operations
• Discussion about various operations
• Your specific operation and the
inherent vulnerabilities
• No one knows your operation better
than you—use this knowledge to
carefully evaluate threats and
corrective actions to mitigate them
Maritime Security
Section 2
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
International conventions, codes,
and recommendations
• United Nations (UN)
– Located in New York
• International Maritime Organization
– Branch of the U.N.
– Located in London
– Giving oversight to SOLAS
– Controlling safety and security of the
high seas
International conventions, codes,
and recommendations
• Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
– Chapter V
• Reg. 19
– Chapter XI
• Regs. 3&5
– Chapter XI-2
• Regs. 1-13
Regulations & Codes
• The ISPS Code
– Part A
• Sec 1 - 19
– Part B
• Guidance given for Part A
– Example of how sections are laid out in both
parts A & B
• Part A
– 1 > 1.2 > 1.2.5
– Key words to remember:
• “Should & Shall” are mandatory
• “May” remains may, not absolute
MTSA Regulations
• 33 CFR—Navigation and Navigable
• Parts 101-106 Maritime Security
– Part 101—General
– Part 103--Area Maritime Security
– Part104—Vessels
– Part 105—Facilities
– Part 106—Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) Facilities
• SOLAS Chapter XI-2, Reg. 1
• ISPS Code A/2 and B/2
• 33 CFR § 101.105
Legal Implications
• Action/non-action by security
– 33 CFR § 101.400-420
– ISPS Code A/4, 6
– SOLAS Chapter XI-2
• Entering foreign jurisdictions
• Clear grounds
Legal Implications
• Law Enforcement
– Vessel, Facility & OCS owners and operators
must permit law enforcement personal, in the
performance of official duties, who show
proper ID to enter/board without delay or
– Upon boarding or entering, will as soon as
possible explain their mission to the master,
operator, owner or designated agent.
– This is found in 33 CFR § 101.515(c)
Handling sensitiverelated information &
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Sensitive Security Information
• Definition—49 CFR § 1520
• ISPS Code—Records
• Documents / Communications
Handling SSI outside U.S.
• The provisions in the plan relating to
ISPC Code, section 9.4 sub. sec.
.2, .4, .5, .7, .15, .17 and .18 of this
Part of the Code are considered as
confidential information, and cannot
be subject to inspection unless
otherwise agreed by the Contracting
Governments concerned.
• Please turn in your ISPS Code to
9.4 and 9.8.1
Section 3
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Security Responsibilities
Contracting Governments
Recognized Security Organizations
The Company
The Ship
The Facility
Vessel Security Officer
Company Security Officer
Facility Security Officer
Vessel and Facility personnel with specific
security duties
• All other personnel
Contracting Governments
• Specific Responsibilities
– ISPS Code A/4, B/1.6-1.8, B/4
– SOLAS , Chapter XI-2, Reg. 3
– 33 CFR, Part 101, 102
• U.S. Coast Guard
• Captain of the Port (COTP)
• Federal Maritime Security Coordinator
• Area Maritime Security (AMS)
Recognized Security
• Specific Responsibilities
– ISPS Code B/4.3-4.6
• USCG is the RSO in U.S.—No
other entities or companies
designated at this time.
The Company
• The Company shall ensure that the
VSP contains a clear statement
emphasizing the master’s authority
• The Company shall designate a
CSO and a VSO and ensure they
are given the necessary support to
fulfill their duties and responsibilities
• 33 CFR § 104.200-205
The Vessel
• The Vessel shall comply with the
requirements of the VSP as per the
security level set—ISPS Part A/7.1
• Compliance documentation—
33 CFR § 104.120
The Facility
• The facility shall comply with the
relevant requirements of Chapter
XI-2 of SOLAS and the ISPS
Code—ISPS Code Part A/14.1
• Compliance documentation—
33 CFR § 105.105-150
• Security Requirements—
33 CFR § 105.200
Security Personnel
Vessel Security Officer
Company Security Officer
Facility Security Officer
Vessel personnel with specific
security duties
• Facility personnel with specific
security duties
• All other personnel
Vessel Security
Section 4
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Vessel Security Assessment
• A written document that is based on the
collection of background information and
the completion and analysis of an onscene survey—see 33 CFR §
104.305a,b, and c
• Essential & integral part of developing
the Vessel Security Plan
• Must be carried out by person(s) with
appropriate skills/knowledge as identified
in 33 CFR § 104.300d
On-Scene Survey
• Vessel owner/operator must ensure
that an on-scene survey is
conducted for each vessel
• Verify and collect background
• Examines and evaluates existing
vessel protective measures,
procedures, and operations
On-scene Survey
– On Scene Survey
• Supervising the handling of cargo and the
delivery of ship’s stores; and
• Ensuring that vessel security
communication, information, and
equipment are readily available.
• Using the ship’s GA’s to do the OSS
should be done to make sure that parts of
the vessel have not been changed and
door ways turned into bulk heads.
Analysis and recommendations
• Analyzing background information,
the on-scene survey, and other
requirements of this part to provide
recommendations for the security
measures the vessel should include
in the VSP—see 33 CFR §
• Threat analysis (documentation)
Threat Assessment Methodology
• Reference NVIC 10-02 (hand-out)
• Select a scenario
• Use the information that you have
compiled in the 1st phase of your
• Things to consider:
– Your type of vessel
– Your cargo
– Your crew
– Your route
Threat Assessment Methodology
The evolution of Assessment process
Table 1 scenario selections
Score consequence as it relates
to your vessel
• Note the fact that the consequence
score will not change.
• You need to look at the big picture
and understand where your
consequence truly scores.
– Impact of 9-11
– Lose of life
– Ecological damage
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Computing the scores
• Go to table 5 work sheet
• First, plug in the Consequence score
• Then, add both of the Accessibility
scores together
• Take the Consequence score and the
total Accessibility score and run them
through the Threat Matrix.
• Find out what vulnerabilities you have to
Mitigate, Consider, or Document.
Table 5
Mitigation definitions
Mitigation strategies, such as security
protective measures and/or procedures,
may be developed to reduce risk for that
scenario. An appendix to the VSP may
contain the scenario(s) evaluated, the
results of the evaluation, a description of
the mitigation measures evaluated, and
the reason mitigation measures were or
were not chosen.
Mitigation definitions
The scenario should be considered
and mitigation strategies should be
developed on a case-by-case basis.
The VSP may contain the
scenario(s) evaluated, the results of
the evaluation, and the reason
mitigation measures were or were
not chosen.
Mitigation definitions
The scenario may not need a mitigation
measure at this time and therefore needs
only to be documented. However,
mitigation measures having little cost
may still merit consideration. The
security plan may contain the scenario
evaluated and the results. This will be
beneficial in further revisions of the VSP,
to know if the underlying assumptions
have changed since the last edition of
the security assessment.
Security Assessment
• Use of Assessment checklists
• NVIC 10-02
• VSA Report—see 33 CFR §
Security Equipment
Section 5
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Security Equipment
• Personal Identification (ID Badges)
– Laminated or secured against tampering
– Contain:
• Individual’s full 1st name and last names
with middle initial
• An accurate passport type photo that is
• Bear the name of the issuing authority
• A government authority or organization
• The person’s employer, union or trade
association must also be on the card
• Watermark
Security Equipment
• ID scanners
Security Equipment
Key pad entries
Security Equipment
Screening equipment
Hand Held
Shoe scanner
Letter scanner
Security Equipment
• Use of dogs not only works, but is a good
deterrent to the would-be attackers that
might be doing reconnaissance
Security Equipment
• Adequate lighting
is one of the best
ways to put up the
air of security.
• Remember that
bad guys don’t
like light
• Also a very good
counter swimmer
Security Equipment
• Good fencing and gates
Security Equipment
• Waterside Perimeter
Security Equipment
Testing, Calibration,
and Maintenance
• It is the duty of the VSO to ensure that the
security equipment is properly working,
operated, tested, maintained, and calibrated
• Records of all maintenance, calibration and
testing of security equipment
See 33 CFR 104.235(b)(5)
• This record must be protected from
unauthorized access or disclosure
• These records must be keep for a minimum of 2
years and must be made available to the USCG
upon request
Vessel Security Plan
Section 6
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Purpose of the VSP
• Address each vulnerability identified
in the VSA (VSAR)
• Describe security measures for
each MARSEC Level
• Each vessel must have a VSP
approved by the USCG (MSC)
• See 33 CFR § 104.400
Contents of the VSP
• General Sections of VSP are listed
in 33 CFR 104.405
• Specific details of content that must
be included in all Sections, is listed
in 33 CFR 104, Subpart B, §§
104.200-104.297, as applicable
• SSAS plan for SOLAS vessels
Confidentiality Issues
• The VSP must be protected from
unauthorized access or disclosure!
• The VSP shall be considered Sensitive
Security Information (SSI) and must
conform to the handling requirements
identified in NVIC 10-04
• Contents of VSP are generally not
subject to inspection by Port State
Control (SOLAS vessels—ISPS A/9.8.1)
Development of the VSP
• The CSO is responsible for ensuring
that the VSP is prepared and
submitted for approval
• Security measured identified in the
VSP must be in place by the time
the plan is audited by the USCG
(local COTP)
Development of the VSP
Discussion and Review
Of VSP Development
33 CFR 104.405(b)
33 CFR 104.200-104.297
Approval of the VSP
• The VSP must be written in English and
submitted to MSC for approval
• 3 Stages of Approval:
– General compliance of all main
– Compliance with detailed requirements
of all Sections
– Congruent with area Port Security
Plan and practical for nature of vessel
• See 33 CFR § 104.410
Implementation of the VSP
• Ensure ALL personnel receive
appropriate training and regular drills and
• Ensure coordination of security issues
takes place between facilities and
• Ensure security communications are
readily available and that security
systems and equipment are installed and
• See 33 CFR § 104.200—additional
Maintenance and Amendment of
the VSP
Amendments to the VSP
Records and Documentation
Annual Audit reviews
See 33 CFR § 104.415
Threat Identification,
Recognition, and
Section 7
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Recognition and detection of
weapons, dangerous
substances and devices
Weapon Identification
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Beretta 9mm
• 9mm, Semi, Magazine Fed, Recoil
Colt 1911
• .45 Cal, Semi, Magazine Fed,
Recoil Operated
MP 5
9 MM, Semi & Auto, Gas operated,
Mag Fed,
M 4 Carbine
• 5.56 MM, Mag Fed, Gas Operated,
AK 47
• 7.62 MM, Semi and Auto, Mag Fed,
Gas Operated
AK 47
P 90
• 5.56 MM,
Russian “AK” design, assassin's
Note easy way it breaks down
Can you tell the real one?
Air Soft
Can you tell the real one?
Air Soft
Can you tell the real one?
Air Soft
Can you tell the real one?
Air Soft
Can you tell the real one?
Air Soft
The right answer is that they are
ALL real in the dark!
Chemical Bomb
Chemical bomb
Mail bombs
• Suspicious Mail
– Hard or ridged
– Oily marks on the
– The feel of wires
– Lots of postage
– Directed to a
specific person
Methods of physical
searches and nonintrusive inspections
Practical Exercise
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Methods of Physical
Screening and Inspections
Methods of Physical
Screening and Inspections
Implementing and
coordinating searches
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Implementation and
Coordinating Searches
• Planning and practicing searches
• Check-card system
• Necessary equipment
flashlights and batteries;
screwdrivers, wrenches and crowbars;
mirrors and probes;
gloves, hard hats, overalls and non-slip footwear;
plastic bags and envelopes for collection of evidence;
forms on which to record activities and discoveries
Implementation and
Coordinating Searches
• Systematic search procedures
– Search teams
– Dividing rooms/spaces into sections
– Focused attention and clearing areas
• Crew members and facility personnel
should not be allowed to search their
own areas in recognition of the possibility
that they may have concealed packages
or devices in their own work or personal
• Known areas for concealment
– (See Handout)
Implementation and
Coordinating Searches
Room searching
There is a system: from the center up 90 degrees
and then up another 90 degrees
2 man teams ALWAYS
At HQ keep track of clear areas
Recognition of persons
posing potential
security risks
Non-discriminatory basis
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Characteristics and behavioral
The Secret Service believes that inquiry
should focus on an individual’s behaviors
and communications to determine if the
individual appears to be planning or
preparing for an attack. Behavior, bodylanguage and communication are more
effective indicators to measure an
aggressor’s escalation.
Characteristics and behavioral
The U.S. Secret Service reports that the
use of profiles, particularly racial or
ethnic profiles, is not effective either for
identifying individuals who may pose a
risk for targeted violence or – once an
individual has been identified – for
assessing the risk that a particular
individual may pose for targeted
Characteristics and behavioral
• Profiling:
– Ethnic back ground
– Religion
– Dress
– Actions
– Accents
– Beliefs
– Political following
Characteristics and behavioral
• Profiling: the facts
– You cannot tell by any means who might be a
– In the Maritime Security field any person coming
onto your vessel could posse a threat
– Visitors
• Check ID’s for fakes
– Venders
• Don’t assume they have not been approached
– Persons taking pictures of vessel or facility
– Note that the U.S. 33-CFR doesn’t refer to nondiscriminatory bases
Characteristics and behavioral
• Security personnel should understand
and react to persons exhibiting unsafe
appearance or behavior. Cues to unsafe
– Inappropriate clothing for weather
– Conscious and unconscious “re-adjusting” of
– Suspicious “bulges” in clothing
– Unconscious “checking” for weapon
• Suspicious persons/activities (hand-out)
Techniques used to
circumvent security
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Techniques Used to Circumvent
Security Measures
In 2005, Al-Qaida trained over
200 divers. These are 2 that
where caught in the Philippines
Techniques Used to Circumvent
Security Measures
Disabling alarm systems
Lock picking equipment
Glass cutting equipment
Wire / Bolt cutters
Fake ID badges / uniforms
CCTV disabling spray
Computer hacking
Crowd Management & Control
VSO’s, FSO’s and CSO’s may find
themselves conducting crowd control in
very difficult situations. They may
discover that some groups will not accept
them. They may have to impose order in
their area of jurisdiction to protect
employees, passengers and the general
public. Moreover, they will be under
intense media and political scrutiny.
Enlightened command and control
techniques help to make decision-making
more effective in an emergent crowd
control situation.
Crowd Management & Control
• Scenarios that may require Crowd
– Sporting/Social Events
– Demonstrations
– Humanitarian/Environmental
– Loading/Unloading of passengers
– Civil War/Unrest
Crowd Management & Control
• Contributing Factors
– Alcohol
– Drug Abuse
– Fear
– Hooliganism
– Poor Administration/Management
– Employee/Union Disputes
Crowd Management & Control
• Important questions are as follows:
– Who are they? What is the overarching identity of the
– What are their goals?
– What is the composition of the crowd and are there
any known factions?
– What are they capable of doing?
– What are their traditional behaviors or cultural
– When and where will they assemble?
– Where will they go?
– What are the possible targets of violence?
– What is the worst case scenario?
– When and where will they disperse?
– Are there plans for subsequent gatherings?
Crowd Management & Control
• For vessels and facilities, planning
must include:
– Organizing emergency procedures
– Optimizing the use of resources
– Controlling the response to emergencies by
identifying, prioritizing and controlling the
most critical threats.
– Controlling crew, passengers and other
personnel during emergency situations
– Establishing and maintaining effective
Crowd Management & Control
• Training programs should be designed
by to train crewmembers and security
personnel in:
Vessel layout and familiarization
Location of safety and emergency equipment
Location of emergency exits
Use of personal lifesaving appliances
Compliance of the ship’s safety and
emergency procedures
– Crowd management and communications
during an emergency situation
Crowd Management & Control
• Control and Management
– Inner, Intermediate, and outer
– Enforcing cordons
Access Control measures
Manned Checkpoints
Natural/Physical barriers
Tapes “funneling persons”
– Monitoring/Communication
– Signage
Ship Security Actions
Section 8
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Security levels—required actions
The Commandant of the USCG will
set the MARSEC level consistent
with the Homeland Security
Advisory System (HSAS)
Homeland Security
Advisory System
Maritime Security Level
Security levels—required actions
• MARSEC Level 1
– The level for which
minimum Appropriate
protective security
measures shall be
maintained at all times
• MARSEC Level 2
– Means the level for
which appropriate
additional protective
security measures
shall be maintained for
a period of time as
result of heightened
risk of a transportation
• MARSEC Level 3
– Means the level for
which further specific
protective security
measures shall be
maintained for a
limited period of time
when a transportation
security incident is
probable or imminent,
although it may not be
possible to identify the
specific target.
Security levels—required actions
• If a higher MARSEC Level is set for the COTP
zone in which the vessel is located or are about
to enter, they will comply, without undue delay,
with all measures specified in the VSP for
compliance with that higher MARSEC Level;
• The COTP is notified as required by 33 CFR
101.300(c) when compliance with the higher
MARSEC Level has been implemented; and
• For vessels in port that compliance with the
higher MARSEC Level has taken place within
12 Hours of notification; and
Security levels—required actions
• For MARSEC Levels 2 and 3, the VSO will
implement additional security measures and
notify all personnel of the change in Security
Level, identified threats, and emphasize
reporting procedures and stress the need for
increased vigilance;
• For MARSEC Level 3, the VSO will implement
further additional security measures as directed
in this Vessel Security Plan (pursuant to 33 CFR
part 6, 160, or 165) or as directed by the COPT,
such as arrangements to ensure that the vessel
can be towed or moved if deemed necessary by
the Coast Guard;
• Non-compliance issues must be reported
Security levels—additional issues
• Unless otherwise directed each port,
vessel, and facility shall operate at
MARSEC Level 1;
• The COTP may temporarily raise the
MARSEC Level for the port, a specific
marine operation within the port or a
specific industry within the port when
necessary to address exigent
Maintaining Security of the
Vessel/Facility Interface
• Definition of Interface (33 CFR
• Security Measures during interfaces
effected by MARSEC Levels
• Coordination of duties between
• Review of VSP and FSP
Declaration of Security (DoS)
• Definition of Declaration of Security (33
CFR 101.105)
• Contracting governments determine
when a DoS shall be completed
– Determined by type of vessel and current
– Continuing DoS’s
– COTP request at any time
• Master, VSO, or designated
representative must complete it
Declaration of Security (DoS)
• May be requested by vessel
– Vessel is at higher MARSEC Level;
– Agreements between Contracting
Government’s for certain vessels or
– Security threat or incident
– Interfacing facility is not required to
have an approved FSP
– Interfacing vessel is not required to
have an approved VSP
Implementation of Security
• Security Measures to be taken at
all three MARSEC Levels
Performance of all vessel security duties
Access Control
Restricted Areas
Handling Cargo
Delivering vessel stores and bunkers
Monitoring and Communication
Additional measures for cruise ships,
passenger vessels, and ferries
Implementation of Security
• Putting it all into action—an
ongoing process
– Defined security duties and
– Training, Drills, and Exercises
– Security Challenges
– Regular communication of security
procedures, threats, and concerns
Preparedness, Drills &
Section 9
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Contingency Planning
Contingency plans are based on any
security incident the vessel may
encounter and are guidelines for the
VSO to follow. Each security incident
will merit its own evaluation, and the
procedures and measures used will be
based on several factors that only the
VSO can decide at the time of the
security incident. Any such actions
taken shall always consider the safety
of the crew, passengers, and vessel as
Contingency Planning
• Action to take in the event of a
security incident
– All vessel personnel are familiar with the
various types of security incidents through
security training provided by the company, to
include the appropriate communication lines of
– Any personnel having knowledge of or
witnessing a security incident, of any degree,
will immediately notify the VSO or Master with
– The VSO will notify, without delay, the CSO,
National Response Center (NRC) and the local
COTP, and take instructions as are available for
responding to a given security incident;
Contingency Planning
• Action to take in the event of a
security incident (cont.)
– The VSO will ensure communication lines are
maintained with the above entities and any other
agencies involved in responding to a security incident;
Pilot House will immediately be secured;
– The VSO will convene a meeting and brief personnel;
– The VSO will sound alarms as appropriate, to include
the SSAS, depending on the immediacy and severity
of the incident.
– Implement measures for various contingency plans, as
– Prepare to evacuate all personnel and visitors from
the vessel.
Contingency Planning
• Emergency Contact Information for
the following incidents:
– Notification of suspicious activities,
persons, or packages;
– Notification of breaches of security;
– Notification of transportation security
incident (TSI)
(See enclosed contact information)
Contingency Planning
• Hijacking
• Bomb Threat
• Unidentified objects / explosives on
vessel, in baggage, stores, or persons
• Damage to / destruction of port facility
• Piracy and other hostile boarding
• Stowaways
• Searching vessel
Security Drills and Exercises
• Must test proficiency of vessel personal
in assigned security duties at all
MARSEC Levels.
• Implementation of security measures due
to a raise in MARSEC Level can be listed
as a drill if the report is sent to the COTP.
• Will enable the VSO to Identify any
related security deficiencies that need to
be addressed.
Security Drills and Exercises
• Drills
– Must be conducted every 3 months, except
when the vessel is out of service due to
– Must be repeated when crew change is 25%
or greater (within one week).
– Must test individual elements of the VSP
– Each drill must be recorded.
– These reports will be reviewed by the USCG
upon inspections, and must have the date,
description of drill, participants, lessons
learned which may improve the VSP.
Security Drills and Exercises
• Example of Drills
– Screening (reactive or preventative) of the
vessel, persons, baggage and vehicles
– Unauthorized entry to restricted areas
– Response to alarms
– Communications
– Notification to law enforcement authorities
Security Drills and Exercises
• Exercises
– Conducted at least once each calendar year, with no
more than 18 months between exercises
• Full scale or live;
• Tabletop simulation or seminar format;
• Combined with other appropriate exercises; or
• Combined with elements of the above mentioned
– Vessel-specific or may be part of a cooperative
– Tests communication and notification procedures, and
elements of coordination, resource availability, and
Security Drills and Exercises
• Exercises are a full test of the security
program and include the substantial and
active participation of relevant company and
ship security personnel, and include facility
security personnel and government
authorities depending on the scope and the
nature of the exercises.
• A vessel while along side or moored at a
facility it may participate in the Facility’s
scheduled drill.
Assessment of
Security Drills and Exercises
• Assessments of drills and exercises
helps to identify areas of proficiency
as well as areas of weakness.
• Review lessons learned with
personnel participating.
• Documentation
Third-Party Due Diligence
• VSP reviews and
• Hard Security
• Crew Trainings
Coordinating Drill / Exercises
With Response Agencies
• Local COTP
• Bomb Squad
• Contracted security and local law
• Emergency medical
• Port facility
Mock Drill and Evaluation
(Screening and Searching)
Security Challenges
• Access to the vessel
• Access within the vessel to
Restricted Areas
• 3rd party due diligence
• Helps minimize or eliminate fines or
penalties for non-compliance
Security Administration
Section 10
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Documentation and Records
• The VSO must retain all necessary
security records for at least two years
and make them available to the Coast
Guard upon request. These records may
be kept in electronic format, and if so
must be protected against unauthorized
deletion, destruction, or amendment.
• Security-related records will also be kept
and protected by the VSO from
unauthorized access or disclosure.
Documentation and Records
• Security Records – see handout
• International Ship Security
Certificate (ISSC) – Held onboard
and valid for 5 years
• Continuous Synopsis Record –
SOLAS Chapter XI-1, Regulation 5
Reporting Security Incidents
• Notification of suspicious activities,
persons, or packages
• Notification of breaches of security
• Notification of transportation security
incident (TSI)
• NOTE: Callers to the NRC should be prepared to provide
the following information:
– Their own name and contact information;
– The name and contact information of the suspicious or
responsible party;
– The location of the incident as specifically as possible;
– The description of the incident or activity involved.
Monitoring and Control
• Proper administration of the VSP by
the VSO and CSO
– Security Inspections and audits
– Records and documentation
– Amendments to plan
Security Audits and
The CSO or VSO must ensure an
audit of the VSP is performed
annually, beginning no later than
one year from the initial date of
approval, and attach a letter to the
VSP certifying that the VSP meets
the applicable requirements.
Security Audits and
• Unless impracticable due to the size
and nature of the company or vessel,
personnel conducting internal audits of
the security measures specified in the
VSP or evaluating it’s implementation
– Have knowledge of methods for
conducting audits and inspections, and
security, control, and monitoring
– Not have regularly assigned security
– Be independent of any security measures
being implemented.
Reporting Nonconformities
• Change in the company’s or vessel’s
ownership or operator
• Modifications to the vessel, including
but not limited to physical structure,
emergency response procedures,
security measures, or operations
• Require amendments of either the VSA
or VSP must be submitted to the MSC
for review and approval no later than
30 days after completion of the audit
and a letter certifying that the amended
VSP meets the applicable
Security Training
Section 11
International Maritime Security Network, LLC ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
Training Requirements
Company Security Officer
Vessel Security Officer
Personnel with Security Duties
All Other Personnel
(33 CFR 104.210, 215, 220, 225)
Instructional Techniques
• Instructional
– The CSO & VSO must train persons
with and with out security duties.
– The method of teaching must take
into account social / cultural
background of trainees
– It is important to explain, show, and
review every topic that you teach to
ensure the student fully understands
• Lecture / Slide Shows
• Handouts / Quiz’s
• Group Discussions
Instructional Techniques
• Practical / Hands-on
– Scenario-based training and case
– Build scenarios with your students.
This will help keep them always
thinking about security
– Screening and Searching
• Vessels, Persons, Baggage and stores
• Buildings, rooms
• Other unique areas

Slide 1