GridStat
Middleware for More Extensible and
Resilient Status Dissemination
for the Electric Power Grid
Faculty: Dave Bakken, Carl Hauser, Anjan Bose
Students: H. Gjermundrød, I. Dionysiou, R. Johnston
P. Jiang, S. Sheshadi, K. Swenson
School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
Washington State University
Pullman, Washington USA
http://gridstat.eecs.wsu.edu
November, 2003
Overview of Presentation
• Background and Motivation
• GridStat Architecture
• Gridstat Implementation and Deployment Issues
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–2
Power Grid Today
Overview
Generation
• 3 fundamental roles
• Historically one
vert-integr. utility
• IT/control based on
this fixed hierarchy
Transmission Substation
Subtransmission
Substations
Transmission
Hierarchy
• Substation
• Control Area/utility
• Grid
Distribution
Substations
Distribution
Customers
(Create load)
Residential
Commercial
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Industrial
Dave Bakken
Figure credit: NSTAC
GridStat–3
Protection and Control Today are Local
• Remedial Action Schemes (RAS): hardwired remote link to trigger a
protective relay
• Otherwise almost exclusively local monitoring (status) & local control
– Power dynamics are grid wide, and anomalies can affect a wide geographic area
G e n e ra tio n
G e n e ra tio n
G e n e ra tio n
D istrib u tio n
D istrib u tio n
D istrib u tio n
C u sto m e r
C u sto m e r
U T IL IT Y B
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
C u sto m e r
U T IL IT Y A
Dave Bakken
C u sto m e r
U T IL IT Y C
GridStat–4
The Changing Landscape
• Higher demand for power transmission – miles x megawatts
– More power and longer distances with little new transmission
capacity
• Installed transmission capacity constrained by minimum of
– Thermal limit
– Stability limit
• More participants whose actions affect grid stability
• Technology in recent years is adding
– Many more devices “intelligent” devices
– Much more heterogeneity
• Lack of central authority
• Terrorist concerns
– Labor disputes, Environmental Liberation Front, everybody is an
insider (or can be with a little effort), …
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–5
Power Companies Are More Interrelated
• Traditional generation +
transmission +
distribution is no longer
inside a single utility
G e n e ra tio n
G e n e ra tio n
D istrib u tio n
D istrib u tio n
C u sto m e r
C u sto m e r
C u sto m e r
U T IL IT Y B
U T IL IT Y A
G e n e ra tio n
– Utilities can be affected by
many things they cannot
sense/detect/measure with
today’s communication
infrastructure
– Interactions between power
dynamics and grid
communicaiton dynamics
completely unknown
D istrib u tio n
C u sto m e r
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
U T IL IT Y C
Dave Bakken
GridStat–6
ISO and Grid Security
• Independent System Operator (ISO): layer above the control
area layer added in the last few years
– A small number of ISOs for bigger grids
– Real-time balancing of supply and demand
• ISO is responsible for grid security
– Means no actions being considered, or any probable
contingency, can lead to a blackout or brownout
– Roughly translates to what computer scientists would consider
stability and reliability
• Grid security is an on-line, real-time activity
– ISO monitors status from all control areas
– Receives status info from control areas and substations in its
jurisdiction
• ISO’s functionality previously performed by the verticallyintegrated utilities
– Now too much power flowing across and around them
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–7
Status Information & the Power Grid
• Changing requirements
– More general topology and connectivity including multicast
– Existing hardwired, hierarchical structure does not suffice
• Status items may be needed at multiple locations
– New services require more quantity, timeliness, …
• Improved real-time controls to push stability limits nearer thermal limits
• Situation awareness: phone calls not adequate!
• 4-second SCADA cycle moving to ½ to 4 times per 60 Hz cycle
• Opportunities for new kinds of automatic real-time control
– Local control of devices based on remotely sensed status
– Closed loop controls with relatively long delays
– Stochastic control
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–8
GridStat in a Nutshell
• SCADA is a distributed computing problem
– Convey status data in a reliable, timely and secure manner (QoS)
– Above the network layer
• Implementing these QoS properties requires considerable sophistication
• Exploit application-level semantics and QoS requirements
• Want a re-usable architecture
– Compare to Web:TCP as SDM:network layer
• GridStat: status dissemination middleware tailored for
the power grid
– Common service platform for disseminating power grid status
information within and between power utilities, marketers, etc.
– Timely, robust, and secure delivery to multiple participants
– Collaborative project with CS and EE at WSU, others
– Also applicable to status dissemination needs of other
infrastructures: transportation, water, gas, …
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–9
GridStat is Publish-Subscribe Middleware
• Publish-subscribe architecture
– Publish: periodically announce status values
– Subscribe: periodically receive status values
– Simple, CORBA-compliant APIs for both publishers and
subscribers, management/control infrastructure, etc.
– Subscribers have transparent cache of latest status value
– Network of internal servers managed for QoS
– Optimized for semantics of status items
• Not just arbitrary event delivery like generic publish-subscribe
Subscriber #1
Publisher
Subscriber #2
…
Subscriber #N
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–10
What is Middleware?
• Middleware == A layer of software above the operating
system but below the application program that provides
common programming abstractions for distributed
systems
• Middleware exists to help manage the complexity and
heterogeneity inherent in distributed systems
• Middleware provides higher-level building blocks for
programmers than the OS provides
–
–
–
–
Makes code more portable
Makes programmers more productive
Final product is of higher quality
Analogy — MW:sockets ≈ HOL:assembler
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–11
GridStat Middleware (MW) in Context
Host 1
Distributed
Application
MW QoS
Management
Client
Host 2
Distributed
Application
Client
control control
Middleware API
Middleware
MW
Router
MW
Router
MW
Router
Middleware API
Middleware
Oper. System API
Oper. System API
OS
OS
Comm. CPU
Storage
Storage
CPU Comm.
Wide-Area Network
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–12
Fundamental GridStat Research Issues
• Status dissemination middleware is a new specialization of publishsubscribe MW
– Recognize specialized requirements of status dissemination
– Take advantage of status semantics in order to meet those requirements
– What are the APIs? What promises are made by the middleware to the
application regarding functionality and performance?
– What architecture can deliver on these promises?
– How can we validate the correctness, timeliness, quality, etc, of a concrete
embodiment of the architecture (the framework)?
– What are the trust issues between grid participants. What policies are required?
How can they be implemented?
– How can the architecture be made economically scalable and manageable
• Goal of GridStat resarch is to begin answering some of these
questions and embody those answers in the GridStat middleware
framework
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–13
Overview of Presentation
• Preliminary Information
• GridStat Architecture
• Gridstat Implementation and Deployment Issues
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–14
Publication and Subscription
• Status variable – located at a publishers
– Periodic sequence of time-stamped values or
– Sporadic sequence of time-stamped alerts
– Types supported (initial, illustrative set):
3.75
3.79
3.76
time3 time2 time1
27.93 27.56 24.33
time3 time2 time1
alert
time1
• Basic values: scalars of type bool or int or float
• Derived values: moving average, change rate, moving average of change
rate, max or min over an interval
– Derived values are first-class: subscribe to them just as to a
basic value
• Subscription – requested by a subscriber
– A promise (by the MW) to deliver values from a particular
status variable at a given rate within the requested delay
(timeliness)
– Subscriber’s rate must not exceed publisher’s rate
– Delay is constrained by the network
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–15
Basic GridStat Functionality
GridStat Management
QoS Requirements
Control
QoS Requirements
Area Controller
Generator
Load Following
Wide Area
Computer Network
Grid Area
Controller
…
Department of
Homeland
Security
…
Subscribers
Publishers
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
ISO
Dave Bakken
GridStat–16
Overview of GridStat’s
… Architecture
QoS Broker
QoS Broker
QoS Requirements
Pub1
…
PubN
R
R
Control
…
R
R
QoS Broker
Control
R
R
QoS Requirements
…R
R
Sub1
…
SubN
GridStat delivers status events from publishers to subcribers
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–17
Detailed Architecture
QoS
broker 1
Key:
Border
Status
Router
(Edge)
Status
Router
Status
Router
QoS
broker 2
leaf QoS
broker 4
Publisher 1
leaf QoS
broker 5
leaf QoS
broker 6
J
D
E
A
F
B
QoS
broker 3
C
H
G
L
I
K
M
R
O
Q
N
P
S
Publisher 2
Publisher 3
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–18
Route Allocation to Subscriber1
QoS
broker 1
Key:
Border
Status
Router
(Edge)
Status
Router
Status
Router
QoS
broker 2
QoS
broker 3
Subscriber 1
leaf QoS
broker 4
Publisher 1
leaf QoS
broker 6
J
D
E
A
F
B
leaf QoS
broker 5
C
H
G
L
I
K
M
R
O
Q
N
P
S
Publisher 2
Publisher 3
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–19
Route Allocation to Subscriber2
QoS
broker 1
Key:
Border
Status
Router
(Edge)
Status
Router
Status
Router
QoS
broker 2
QoS
broker 3
Subscriber 1
leaf QoS
broker 4
Publisher 1
leaf QoS
broker 6
J
D
E
A
F
B
leaf QoS
broker 5
C
H
G
L
I
K
M
R
O
Q
P
N
S
Publisher 2
Publisher 3
Subscriber 2
Note: Sub2 may have a different rate or latency than Sub1
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–20
GridStat & UCA v2 & SCADA Co-Existence
Key
GridStat Status Data
(phone calls today)
Homeland
Defense
GridStat QoS Control
(later status aggregation)
ISO
ISO
Utility #1
Control
Center
UCAv2
Substation
UCAv2
Substation
Utility #2
Control
Center
SCADA
Substation
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
SCADA
Substation
Dave Bakken
Other Critical
Infrastructures
Note: UCA v2 has
no wide-area
network mgmt,
though it discusses
exploiting “future
communcations
services”
GridStat–21
Programming Model: GridStat Subscriber Caches
…
…
Status1
Status1
Status Router
Status2
Status2
Subscriber1
…
cache1
Status2
…
Status Router
Status3
Status3
Subscriber2
…
cache2
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–22
Programming Model: Condensation Functions
Status1
…
Status
Router
StatusJ
Condense
StatusN
• If desired derivation is not built in, condensation
functions allow applications to define new derived status
variables
– Sometimes subscribers just read a large set of status items
once to calculate a derived variable
– Supported by allowing user-defined condensation functions to
be loaded in status routers
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–23
Overview of Presentation
• Preliminary Information
• GridStat Architecture
• Gridstat Implementation and Deployment Issues
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–24
Pragmatic Deployment Feasibility Notes
• GridStat not completely deployable using best-effort
internet technology
– But much of the traffic might be best effort, especially with
bandwidth reservation
• Most likely deployment path: grid-wide intranet
– Washington Post: “In a book-length Electricity Infrastructure Security
Assessment, the industry concluded on Jan. 7 that "it may not be possible to
provide sufficient security when using the Internet for power system control."
Power companies, it said, will probably have to build a parallel private network
for themselves.” (emphasis mine)
• Not only would security be lacking, but predictable timeliness and resilience too!!!!!
The Internet is arguably as complex as the grid! GridStat Team Opinion
– Some portions likely co-located with tel-cos and national ISPs’ facilities; others
built using private facilities of electric utilities
– In addition to short-term application, GridStat should be viewed as a platform
for exploring what services to provide in status dissemination middleware
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–25
GridStat Capabilities Today
• Static routing of status variables to meet subscriber’s
timeliness and redundancy requirements
• Recovery from data link and management link failure
• Hierarchical QoS brokers
• Graphic visualization of status items (strip charts etc) and of
the internals of leaf QoS brokers (queues, etc)
• Note: GridStat could deliver remote control commands in
addition to status data
– Just another kind of data to deliver….
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–26
GridStat Prototype
• Finished: 2nd-Generation
Distributed Prototype with
– Hierarchy of QoS Managers
performing the allocations
– Publisher delivery rate & redundancy
QoS requirements satisfied
– Optional exception callback to
subscriber of QoS violated
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–27
Future GridStat Capabilities (Funding Pending)
• Fault Tolerance at many more levels
• Broader QoS Routing with runtime feedback
• Trust management system to allow secure runtime
subscriptions
• Pre-allocated subscription “packages” for rapid deployment
in contingencies
• Validation framework (SW quality, QoS delivery)
• Hardware support
• Modeling and control theory for communication dynamic
and power dynamics interacting
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–28
Ongoing & Future Research Issues
• Investigating a range of optimizations
– Periodic status items only delivered if enough change
• percentage
• fixed delta
– Throttle back lower priority status flows when overload, attack,
accidents, etc. using subscription info (max timeliness, min
redundancy)
– Subscription aggregation of different kinds of flows and sub-flows
• Resilience
– Subscriber cache extrapolation
– Adaptive path management
• Push the data path into hardware or embedded processors
– 10% of code perhaps
– Status routers, HW registers for publishers and subscribers
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–29
Collaborators, Funding, and Colleagues
• Faculty: David E. Bakken, Carl Hauser, Anjan Bose,
• Students: Ioanna Dionysiou, Kjell “Harald” Gjermundrød, Thomas
Evje, Ryan Johnston, Supreeth Sheshadri, Ping Jiang
• Funding:
– US Dept. of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
Critical Infrastructure Protection Program, Grant #60NANB1D0116 (Dr. Tim
Grance, PM)
– The National Science Foundation, Grant CCR-0326006 (Dr. Helen Gill, PM)
– Pending: DHS, soon NSF ITR (Feb 03)
• Collaborators:
– Prof. Kevin Tomsovic, WSU, realtime grid control with varying feedback loops
and varying time horizons
– Prof. Sandip Roy, WSU, control theory with stochastic delays
– Prof. Deborah Frincke, U of Idaho, security and trust
– Other WSU professors with interests in temporal queries, hardware
implementation, graph theory, software engineering
– CMU/CERT: Easel Simulation System and GridStat; IT modeling for power
grids, …
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–30
GridStat & Avista
• Now working with Avista Utilities to experiment with
distribution status data dissemination
– Utility for WSU’s area, with presence in 5 western states
• Technology demonstration deployment underway
• Avista has donated $2.4M in dark fiber around
– Spokane area
– Pullman (WSU)
– Moscow, ID (U. Idaho; 8 miles from WSU)
to support GridStat and similar research and distributed
evaluation at WSU, U. Idaho
– Funds for “access points” and Avista engineering labor also
provided
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–31
Related Work
• Computer Science (networking, distributed computing):
–
–
–
–
PASS (BBN/Gatech ICDCS ’99 Zinky/O’Brien/Bakken/…)
Sienna (U. Colorado): content-based publish-subscribe
InfoPipes (GaTech): fresh delivery of status info
SpinGlass/Astrolabe (Cornell): scaleable multicast
• Electrical Engineering (power)
– A few research papers pointing out the wide-area
communication deficiencies
– UCA version 2: nice “wrapping” of substation devices,
but no QoS management across WANs.
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–32
Conclusions
• Existing power grid SCADA/DCS infrastructure is
not adequate
– Deregulation and restructuring
– Efficient use of transmission resources
• GridStat: status dissemination middleware tailored
for the power grid
– Publish-subscribe architecture with simple, CORBA-compliant
APIs for both publishers and subscribers
– Subscribers have transparent cache of latest status value
– Network of internal servers managed for QoS
• Timeliness
• Redundancy
• Security
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–33
Questions?
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–34
Background Slides
•
•
•
•
Power Grid 101
Washington Post quotations on power grid cyber attacks
Middleware 101
More GridStat Details
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–35
Context
“The ultimate challenge in creating the power delivery system of the 21st
century is in the development of a communications infrastructure that
allows for universal connectivity.”
“In order to create this new power delivery system, what is needed is a
national electricity-communications superhighway that links
generation, transmission, substations, consumers, and distribution
and delivery controllers.”
Clark Gellings, EPRI Vice President for Power Delivery and Markets, in
“Smart Power Delivery ― A vision for the Future,” EPRI Journal
Online, Electric Power Research Institute, June 9, 2003
http://www.epri.com/journal/details.asp?doctype=features&id=618.
GridStat is researching, implementing, and evaluating this
“national electricity-communications superhighway”,
and not just for the power grid but for other critical
infrastructures as well.
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–36
Power Grid Today
• Three fundamental roles in the power grid:
1. Generation
2. Transmission
3. Distribution
• Traditionally owned by a single, vertically-integrated
company
– Based largely on geography
– Hierarchical infrastructure
– Communications network is
• Hardwired
• Dedicated
• Slow
• Everything is hard-coded based on this fixed hierarchy
– Application programs
– Status information
– Control decisions
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–37
Components of the Power Grid
• Generator: generates power, based on requirements given it
• Substation: point of monitoring and control in the grid
– Can service many generators, and/or other functions
• Distribution point to customers
• Voltage boosting
• Control functions
– Generally only services one fundamental role
– Always involved in control based on status of a lot of devices
• Control area: a set of substations
– Geographic area ranging from a county to a few states
– Services all three fundamental roles
– Roughly corresponds to one or a few utility companies (most 1:1)
– Collects status info from all substations for control decisions
• Grid: a set of control areas which are synchronously controlled
– AKA “regional reliability council” or “region”
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–38
Grids in Canada and the US
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–39
ISO and Grid Security
• Independent System Operator (ISO): new layer above the
control area layer currently being added
– A small number of ISOs for bigger grids
• ISO is responsible for grid security
– Means no actions being considered, or any probable
contingency, can lead to a blackout or brownout
– Roughly translates to what computer scientists would consider
stability and reliability
• Grid security is an online, real-time activity
– ISO monitors status from all control areas
– Receives all status info from any control area or substation in
its jurisdiction
• ISO’s functionality used to be performed by the verticallyintegrated utilities
– Now too much power flowing across them or around them
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–40
Pragmatic GridStat Deployment Feasibility Notes
• Allocation algorithms & frequency of subscriptions
– In practice nearly all are likely to be pre-allocated and static
– Number of new subscriptions (allocation algorithm runs) per hour
small
– Could be batched for offline (weekend/night) computation unless
critical
– Even brute-force solutions to NP-hard problems may be practical
in many cases
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–41
Background Slides
•
•
•
•
Power Grid 101
Washington Post quotations on power grid cyber attacks
Middleware 101
More GridStat Details
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–42
Background Slides
Washington Post quotations on cyber attacks “CyberAttacks by El Qaeda Feared” (27 Jun 02, A01))
• Note: emphasis mine and [comments mine] in all cases….
• “The event I fear most is a physical attack in conjunction
with a successful cyber-attack on the responders' 911 system
or on the power grid,” Ronald Dick, director of the FBI's
National Infrastructure Protection Center
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–43
Other Related Quotations from Post Article
• The devices are called distributed control systems, or DCS,
and supervisory control and data acquisition, or SCADA,
systems. ….
What is new and dangerous is that most of these devices are
now being connected to the Internet -- some of them,
according to classified “Red Team” intrusion exercises, in
ways that their owners do not suspect.
Because the digital controls were not designed with public
access in mind, they typically lack even rudimentary
security, having fewer safeguards than the purchase of
flowers online. Much of the technical information required
to penetrate these systems is widely discussed in the public
forums of the affected industries, and specialists said the
security flaws are well known to potential attackers.
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–44
Post Quotations (cont.)
• Digital controls are so pervasive, he said, that terrorists
might use them to cause damage on a scale that otherwise
would “not be available except through a very systematic
and comprehensive physical attack.” [He is Director John
Tritak of the Commerce Department's Critical Infrastructure
Assurance Office]
• To destroy a dam physically would require “tons of
explosives,” Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff
said a year ago. To breach it from cyberspace is not out of
the question. In 1998, a 12-year-old hacker, exploring on a
lark, broke into the computer system that runs Arizona's
Roosevelt Dam. He did not know or care, but federal
authorities said he had complete command of the SCADA
system controlling the dam's massive floodgates.
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–45
Post Quotations (cont.)
• Massoud Amin, a mathematician directing new security efforts in the
industry, described the North American power grid as “the most
complex machine ever built.” At an April 2 conference hosted by the
Commerce Department, participants said, government and industry
scientists agreed that they have no idea how the grid would respond to
a cyber-attack.
What they do know is that "Red Teams" of mock intruders from the
Energy Department's four national laboratories have devised what one
government document listed as "eight scenarios for SCADA attack on
an electrical power grid" -- and all of them work. Eighteen such
exercises have been conducted to date against large regional utilities,
and Richard A. Clarke, Bush's cyber-security adviser, said " the
intruders “have always, always succeeded.”
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–46
Background Slides
•
•
•
•
Power Grid 101
Washington Post quotations on power grid cyber attacks
Middleware 101
More GridStat Details
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–47
Why Middleware?
• Middleware == “A layer of software above the operating
system but below the application program that provides
a common programming abstraction across a
distributed system”
• Middleware exists to help manage the complexity and
heterogeneity inherent in distributed systems
• Middleware provides higher-level building blocks
(“abstractions”) for programmers than the OS provides
–
–
–
–
Can make code much more portable
Can make them much more productive
Can make the resulting code have fewer errors
Analogy — MW:sockets ≈ HOL:assembler
• Middleware sometimes is informally called “plumbing”
– Connects parts of a distributed application with “data pipes” and
passes data between them
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–48
Middleware in Context
Host 1
Distributed
Application
Host 2
Distributed Server
Application
Client
Middleware API
Middleware API
Middleware
Middleware
Operating System API
OS
Comm.
Processing
Storage
Operating System API
OS
Comm.
Processing
Storage
Network
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–49
Middleware Benefit: Masking Heterogeneity
• Middleware’s programming building blocks mask
heterogeneity
– Makes programmer’s life much easier!!
• Kinds of heterogeneity masked by middleware (MW)
frameworks
– All MW masks heterogeneity in network technology
– All MW masks heterogeneity in host CPU
– Almost all MW masks heterogeneity in operating system (or family
thereof)
• Notable exception: Microsoft middleware (de facto; not de jure or de fiat)
– Almost all MW masks heterogeneity in programming language
• Noteable exception: Java RMI
– Some MW masks heterogeneity in vendor implementations
• CORBA best here
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–50
Background Slides
•
•
•
•
Power Grid 101
Washington Post quotations on power grid cyber attacks
Middleware 101
More GridStat Details
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–51
Path Determination to Provide Fault
Tolerance and Timeliness
• Initial QoS Specification for Subscriptions
– Desired latency
– Number of redundant paths desired
• Timeliness and fault tolerance
– Choose multiple, disjoint paths that meet the requested delay
constraint while respecting capacity constraints of links and
routers
– Many variants of multi-constrained QoS routing are NP-hard (of
course!), including most of the ones that we think are relevant for
GridStat
– Choose paths using heuristics; if a (set of) paths is found the
system should guarantee its performance
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–52
GridStat Mapping Capabilities (cont.)
Note: there are not GridStat nodes deployed as above; for illustration purposes only
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–53
GridStat Status Patterns
• Pragmatic goal: give building blocks that nondistributed-systems-specialists can effectively use in
grid monitoring and control applications
– Try to capture status semantics + some QoS info
• Initial derived value examples
– Periodic: Bandwidth use downstream limited by downstream
subscriptions. Can be boolean, floating point, integer.
– Alert: Potentially catastrophic situation
• Propagate to subscribers immediately
• Deliver using callback/interrupt (not just cache update)
• Note: it is very useful to distinguish between anomaly domains: is it a
power grid problem or IT infrastructure problem
Copyright © 2003 Washington State University
Dave Bakken
GridStat–54
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