Procurement Auctions - Analysis of Competition
and Information Disclosed: Preliminary Results
Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Matteo Zanza – Consip Research Unit
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Index
2
1.
Questionnaires received
2.
General overview of data collected:
i.
Fixed-line telephone services
ii.
Paper for printers
3.
Awarding prices
4.
The objective of the analysis
5.
The correlation index
6.
Results
7.
Information disclosed
Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Questionnaires received
Fixed Line Telephone Services: 7 (ABA,
BBG, BESCHA, CONSIP,
Irish NPPU, SKI, STATSKONTORET);
Paper for Printers: 11 (ABA,
BBG, BESCHA, CONSIP, HANSEL, Irish
NPPU, French MINEFI, PPD of Cyprus, SKI, STATSKONTORET, UMIC);
Information Disclosed: 9 (ABA,
BBG, BESCHA, CONSIP, Irish NPPU,
French MINEFI, PPD of Cyprus, SKI, UMIC).
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Fixed-Line Telephone Services – A General Overview
Contract features



Economic value of contracts: it varies from 200.000 € to
more than 1 billion of € (Average value excluding the two
biggest contracts lies between 1 and 2 millions of €);
Contract time length: average 29 months;
Number of participants: 3.7 (Concentrated markets!).
Auction design



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Awarding Procedure: 5 Institutions used an Open Procedure
(2 Restricted);
Auction Format: 6 Institutions used the Standard Paper Based
Auction (Only 1 performed it online);
Particular cases:
i.
BESCHA performed a multi-round auction (2 rounds).
ii.
Consip performed a combinatorial auction (Fixed and
Mobile Line Services);
Number of lots: 6 institutions auctioned the Fixed-Line services
within 1 lot. 1 Institution split the contract into 2 lots.
Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Paper for Printers – A General Overview
Contract features



Economic value of contracts: from 300.000 € to 12 million of
€ (Average value excluding the biggest contract lies between 2
and 3 million of €);
Contract time length: average 23 months (It varies from 3 to
36 months);
Number of participants: 5 (It varies from 3 to 10
participants).
Auction Design



Awarding Procedure: 10 Institutions used an Open Procedure
(2 Restricted);
Auction Format: all Institutions applied the Sealed Bid
Standard Paper Based Auction, only one institution performed an
online auction;
Number of lots: Institutions acted differently:
•
•
•
•
•
5
5
3
1
1
1
auctioned
auctioned
auctioned
auctioned
auctioned
only 1 lot;
2 lots (qualitative and geographical lots);
3 lots (qualitative and geographical lots);
5 lots (qualitative and geographical lots);
12 lots (geographical lots).
Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Awarding Prices – A Quick View
Fixed-Line Services – Average Awarding Prices
 Local price for 3 mins. call (connection fees included): 0.0501 €;
Minimum price: 0.0177 €; Maximum price: 0.1 €.
 National/Long distance price for 3 mins. call (connection fees
included): 0.0659 €;
Minimum price: 0,0177 €; Maximum price: 0.15 €.
 Mobile price for 3 mins. call (connection fees included): 0.2943 €;
Minimum price: 0,0316 €; Maximum price: 0.45 €.
Paper for printers – Average Awarding Prices
 A4 rear: 2.15 €;
Minimum price: 1.68 €; Maximum price: 3.21 €.
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Analysis Objective
1/2
We just presented some data on our procurement auctions.
But what we can do with them??
The objective of this study is to analyse the level of competition
reached and to point out which parameters can affect the
suppliers behaviour.
Our
•
•
•
•
analysis focuses on the following 4 variables:
Awarding prices (Dependent variable);
Number of participant firms;
Economical value of the contract;
Time length of the contract.
Other variables will be considered (Number and type of lots, Quality
required, Frequency of auctions, etc.) but up to now we have only few
“comparable” data to manage.
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Analysis Objective
2/2
We made some analysis using the four parameters listed before, but
observing the results obtained we have to keep in mind that:
•
•
•
•
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We need more Questionnaires to make a reliable comparative
analysis;
All the parameters took into account have “crossed influence” on
the awarding prices;
To influence the results some parameters have to vary
consistently (number of participants);
Some variables need to be normalised to be considered
(contracts).
Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Linear Correlation Index
The linear correlation coefficient (or Pearson’s r) reflects the degree to
which two variables are related.
r 
 x

 x yi  y

i
 x
i
9
i
i
x
  y
2
i
 y

2
i
•
The value of r lies between −1 and 1, inclusive.
•
It takes on a value of 1, termed “complete positive correlation,” when the
data points lie on a perfect straight line with positive slope, with x and y
increasing together.
•
If the data points lie on a perfect straight line with negative slope, y
decreasing as x increases, then r has the value −1; this is called “complete
negative correlation”.
•
A value of r near zero indicates that the variables x and y are uncorrelated.
Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Fixed Line Services - Some Results
Correlation between Prices and the Number of participants
r (Plocal, Nparticipants)=-0,396
r (Pnational, Nparticipants)=-0,572
r (Pmobile, Nparticipants)=0,843
Correlation between Prices and Time length of the contract
r (Plocal, Length)=-0,422
r (Pnational, Length)=-0,491
r (Pmobile, Length)=0,456
Correlation between Prices and the Economic value of the contract
r (Plocal, Economic Value)=-0,256
r (Pnational, Economic Value)=-0,087
r (Pmobile, Economic Value)=-0,866
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Fixed Line Services - Some Results
Local Awarding Prices
Correlation between Price and Number of
Participants
0,12
0,1
0,08
0,06
0,04
0,02
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Number of Participants
r (Plocal, Nparticipants)=-0.396
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Fixed Line Services - Some Results
Local awarding prices
Correlation between Price and Number of
Participants
0,06
0,05
0,04
0,03
0,02
0,01
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Number of participants
r (Plocal, Nparticipants)=0,23
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Paper for Printers - Some Results
r(Price, Nparticipants)=0,02
r(Price, EconomicValue)=0,26
r(Price, ContractLength)=0,90
r(price, IncomeperCapita)=0,59
Awarding Prices
Correlation between Prices and Income per Capita
3,50
3,00
2,50
2,00
1,50
1,00
0,50
0,00
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Income per Capita
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Information disclosed
1/2
Questionnaire on information is divided in two main parts:
1. Information disclosed before the auction;
2. Information disclosed after the auction.
1. Information disclosed before the auction
Most of the questions related to this point have been directly taken from the Annex
VII A of the new EU Directive because the Article 36 of the New EU Directive
“Form and manner of publication of notices” states that: “Notices shall include the
information mentioned in Annex VII A…”.
The objective is to make benchmark analysis.
From the responses collected up to now, we can say that almost all institutions
already publish information required by Annex VII.
Only the value of the contract to be awarded is published by the 44% of the
Institutions included within our survey.
All institutions dispatch information included in public contract notice in the Official
Journal of the European Communities and that the majority of them publish all
these useful information directly in their web-site.
No one dispatches, in the notice, the number of expected bidders neither their
names.
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
Information disclosed
2/2
2. Information disclosed after the auction
Almost all Institutions publish the name and the price paid by the
winner.
There is only one Institution that publish the names and scores
obtained by all participants.
Also in this case information are dispatched on the Official Journal of
the European Communities by the large majority of the
Institutions.
Finally, several countries publish also the auction results on a National
Official Journal or within their web site.
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Larnaca, July 4th 2005
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