Faults - analysis
• Z proof and System Validation Tests were most
cost-effective.
• Traditional “module testing” was arduous and
found few faults, except in fixed-point numerical
code.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Proof metrics
• Probably the largest program proof effort
attempted…
– c. 9000 VCs - 3100 Functional & Safety properties, 5900 from
RTC generator.
– 6800 discharged by simplifier (hint: buy a bigger
workstation!)
– 2200 discharged by SPARK proof checker or “rigorous
argument.”
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Proof metrics - comments
• Simplification of VCs is computationally intensive, so
buy the most powerful server available.
• (1998 comment) A big computer is far cheaper than the time of
the engineers using it!
• (Feb. 2001 comment) Times have changed - significant proofs
can now be attempted on a £1000 PC!
• Proof of exception-freedom is extremely useful, and
gives real confidence in the code.
• Proof is still far less effort than module testing.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Difficult bits...
• User-interface.
• Tool support.
• Introduced state.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

User Interface
• Sequential code & serial interface to displays.
• Driving an essentially parallel user-interface is
difficult.
• e.g. Updating background pages, run-indicator, button
tell-backs etc.
• Some of the non-SIL4 displays were complex,
output-intensive and under-specified in SRS.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Tool support
•
SPARK tools are now much better than they were five years
ago! Over 50 improvements identified as a result of SHOLIS.
•
SPARK 95 would have helped.
•
Compiler has been reliable, and generates good code.
•
Weak support in SPARK proof system for fixed and floating
point.
•
Many in-house static analysis tools developed: WCET analysis,
stack analysis, requirements traceability tools all new and
successful.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Introduced state
• Some faults owe to introduced state:
– Optimisation of graphics output.
– Device driver complexity.
– Co-routine mechanisms.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

SHOLIS - Successes
• One of the largest Z/SPARK developments ever.
– Z proof work proved very effective.
• One of the largest program proof efforts ever
attempted.
• Successful proof of exception-freedom on
whole system.
• Proof of system-level safety-properties at both Z
and code level.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

SHOLIS - Successes(2)
• Strong static analysis removes many common faults
before they even get a chance to arrive.
– Software Integration was trivial.
• Successful use of static analysis of WCET and stack use.
• Successful mixing of SIL4 and non-SIL4 code is one
program using SPARK static analysis.
• The first large-scale project to meet 00-55 SIL4. SHOLIS
influenced the revision of 00-55 between 1991 and 1997.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

00-55/56 Resources
• http://www.dstan.mod.uk/
• “Is Proof More Cost-Effective Than Testing?”
King, Chapman, Hammond, and Pryor. IEEE
Transactions on Software Engineering, Volume
26, Number 8. August 2000.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Programme
• Introduction
• What is High Integrity Software?
• Reliable Programming in Standard Languages
– Coffee
• Standards Overview
• DO178B and the Lockheed C130J
– Lunch
• Def Stan 00-55 and SHOLIS
• ITSEC, Common Criteria and Mondex
– Tea
• Compiler and Run-time Issues
• Conclusions
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Outline
• UK ITSEC and Common Criteria schemes
– What are they?
– Who’s using them?
•
•
•
•
Main Principles
Main Requirements
Practical Consequences
Example Project - the MULTOS CA
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

The UK ITSEC Scheme
• The “I.T. Security Evaluation Criteria”
• A set of guidelines for the development of
secure IT systems.
• Formed from an effort to merge the applicable
standards from Germany, UK, France and the
US (the “Orange Book”).
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

ITSEC - Basic Concepts
• The “Target of Evaluation” (TOE) is an IT
System (possibly many components).
• The TOE provides security (e.g. confidentiality,
integrity, availability)
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

ITSEC - Basic Concepts (2)
• The TOE has:
– Security Objectives (Why security is wanted.)
– Security Enforcing Functions (SEFs) (What functionality is
actually provided.)
– Security Mechanisms (How that functionality is provided.)
• The TOE has a Security Target
– Specifies the SEFs against which the TOE will be evaluated.
– Describes the TOE in relation to its environment.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

ITSEC - Basic Concepts (3)
• The Security Target contains:
–
–
–
–
Either a System Security Policy or a Product Rationale.
A specification of the required SEFs.
A definition of required security mechanisms.
A claimed rating of the minimum strength of the
mechanisms. (“Basic, Medium, or High”, based on threat
analysis)
– The target evaluation level.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

ITSEC Evaluation Levels
• ITSEC defines 7 levels of evaluation criteria,
called E0 through E6, with E6 being the most
rigorous.
• E0 is “inadequate assurance.”
• E6 is the toughest! Largely comparable with the
most stringent standards in the safety-critical
industries.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

ITSEC Evaluation Levels
and Required Information
for Vulnerability Analysis
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Evaluation
• To claim compliance with a particular ITSEC
level, a system or product must be evaluated
against that level by a Commercial Licensed
Evaluation Facility (CLEF).
• Evaluation reports answers “Does the TOE
satisfy its security target at the level of
confidence indicated by the stated evaluation
level?”
• A list of evaluated products and systems is
maintained.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

ITSEC Correctness Criteria for each Level
• Requirements for each level are organized
under the following headings:
• Construction - The Development Process
– Requirements, Architectural Design, Detailed Design,
Implementation
• Construction - Development Environment
– Configuration Control, Programming Languages and
Compilers, Developer Security
• Operation - Documentation
– User documentation, Administrative documentation
• Operation - Environment
– Delivery and Configuration, Start-up and Operation
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

ITSEC Correctness Criteria - Examples
• Development Environment - Programming
languages and compilers
– E1 - No Requirement
– E3 - Well defined language - e.g. ISO standard.
Implementation dependent options shall be documented.
The definition of the programming languages shall define
unambiguously the meaning of all statements used in the
source code.
– E6 - As E3 + documentation of compiler options + source
code of any runtime libraries.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

The Common Criteria
• The US “Orange Book” and ITSEC are now
being replaced by the “Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation.”
• Aims to set a “level playing field” for developers
in all participating states.
– UK, USA, France, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, Korea,
Japan, Australia, CanAda, Israel...
• Aims for international mutual recognition of
evaluated products.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

CC - Key Concepts
• Defines 2 type of IT Security Requirement:
• Functional Requirements
– Defines behaviour of system or product.
– What a product or system does.
• Assurance Requirements
– For establishing confidence in the implemented security
functions.
– Is the product built well? Does it meet its requirements?
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

CC - Key Concepts (2)
• A Protection Profile (PP) - A set of security
objectives and requirements for a particular
class of system or product.
– e.g. Firewall PP, Electronic Cash PP etc.
• A Security Target (ST) - A set of security
requirements for specifications for a particular
product (the TOE), against which its evaluation
will be carried out.
– e.g. The ST for the DodgyTech6000 Router
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

CC Requirements Hierarchy
• Functional and assurance requirements are
categorized into a hierarchy of:
• Classes
– e.g. FDP - User Data Protection
• Families
– e.g. FDP_ACC - Access Control Policy
• Components
– e.g. FDP_ACC.1 - Subset access control
– These are named in PPs and STs.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Evaluations Assurance Levels (EALs)
• CC Defined 7 EALs - EAL1 through EAL7
• An EAL defines a set of functional and
assurance components which must be met.
• For example, EAL4 requires ALC_TAT.1, while
EAL6 and EAL7 require ALC_TAT.3
• EAL7 “roughly” corresponds with ITSEC E6 and
Orange Book A1.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

The MULTOS CA
• MULTOS is a multi-application operating system
for smart cards.
• Applications can be loaded and deleted
dynamically once a card is “in the field.”
• To prevent forging, applications and cardenablement data are signed by the MULTOS
Certification Authority (CA).
• At the heart of the CA is a high-security
computer system that issues these certificates.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

The MULTOS CA (2)
• The CA has some unusual requirements:
– Availability - aimed for c. 6 months between reboots, and
has warm-standby fault-tolerance.
– Throughput - system is distributed and has custom
cryptographic hardware.
– Lifetime - of decades, and must be supported for that long.
– Security - most of system is tamper-proof, and is subject to
the most stringent physical and procedural security.
– Was designed to meet the requirements of U.K. ITSEC E6.
• All requirements, design, implementation, and
(on-going) support by Praxis Critical Systems.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

The MULTOS CA - Development Approach
• Overall process conformed to E6
• Conformed in detail where retro-fitting
impossible:
– development environment security
– language and specification standards
– CM and audit information
• Reliance on COTS for E6 minimized or
eliminated.
– Assumed arbitrary but non-byzantine behaviour
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Development approach limitations
• COTS not certified (Windows NT, Backup tool,
SQL Server…)
• We were not responsible for operational
documentation and environment
• No formal proof
• No systematic effectiveness analysis
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

System Lifecycle
• User requirements definition with REVEALTM
• User interface prototype
• Formalisation of security policy and top level
specification in Z.
• System architecture definition
• Detailed design including formal process
structure
• Implementation in SPARK, Ada95 and VC++
• Top-down testing with coverage measurement
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Some difficulties...
• Security Target - What exactly is an SEF?
– No one seems to have a common understanding…
• “Formal description of the architecture of the
TOE…”
– What does this mean?
• Source code or hardware drawings for all
security relevant components…
– Not for COTS hardware or software.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

The CA Test System
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Use of languages in the CA
• Mixed language development - the right tools
for the right job!
– SPARK
30%
– Ada95
30%
– C++
– C
30%
5%
– SQL
5%
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
“Security kernel” of tamper-proof
software
Infrastructure (concurrency, inter-task
and inter-process communications,
database interfaces etc.), bindings to
ODBC and Win32
GUI (Microsoft Foundation Classes)
Device drivers, cryptographic
algorithms
Database stored procedures

Use of SPARK in the MULTOS CA
• SPARK is almost certainly the only industrialstrength language that meets the requirements
of ITSEC E6.
• Complete implementation in SPARK was simply
impractical.
• Use of Ada95 is “Ravenscar-like” - simple, static
allocation of memory and tasks.
• Dangerous, or new language features avoided
such as controlled types, requeue, user-defined
storage pools etc.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Conclusions - Process Successes
• Use of Z for formal security policy and system
spec. helped produce an indisputable
specification of functionality
• Use of Z, CSP and SPARK “extended” formality
into design and implementation
• Top-down, incremental approach to integration
and test was effective and economic
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Conclusions - E6 Benefits and Issues
• E6 support of formality is in-tune with our
“Correctness by Construction” approach
– encourages sound requirements and specification
– we are more rigorous in later phases
• High-security using COTS both possible and
necessary
– cf safety world
• E6 approach sound, but clarifications useful
– and could gain even higher levels of assurance...
• CAVEAT
– We have not actually attempted evaluation
– but benefits from developing to this standard
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

ITSEC and CC Resources
• ITSEC
– www.cesg.gov.uk
• Training, ITSEC Documents, UK Infosec Policy, “KeyMat”, “Non
Secret Encryption”
– www.itsec.gov.uk
• Documents, Certified products list, Background information.
• Common Criteria
– csrc.nist.gov/cc
– www.commoncriteria.org
• Mondex
– Ives, Blake and Earl Michael: Mondex International: Reengineering
Money. London Business School Case Study 97/2. See
http://isds.bus.lsu.edu/cases/mondex/mondex.html
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Programme
• Introduction
• What is High Integrity Software?
• Reliable Programming in Standard Languages
– Coffee
• Standards Overview
• DO178B and the Lockheed C130J
– Lunch
• Def Stan 00-55 and SHOLIS
• ITSEC, Common Criteria and Mondex
– Tea
• Compiler and Run-time Issues
• Conclusions
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Programme
• Introduction
• What is High Integrity Software?
• Reliable Programming in Standard Languages
– Coffee
• Standards Overview
• DO178B and the Lockheed C130J
– Lunch
• Def Stan 00-55 and SHOLIS
• ITSEC, Common Criteria and Mondex
– Tea
• Compiler and Run-time Issues
• Conclusions
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Outline
• Choosing a compiler
• Desirable properties of High-Integrity Compilers
• The “No Surprises” Rule
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Choosing a compiler
• In a high-integrity system, the choice of
compiler should be documented and justified.
• In a perfect world, we would have time and
money to:
– Search for all candidate compilers,
– Conduct an extensive practical evaluation of each,
– Choose one, based on fitness for purpose, technical
features and so on...
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Choosing a compiler (2)
• But in the real-world…
• Candidate set of compilers may only have 1
member!
• Your client’s favourite compiler is already
bought and paid for…
• Bias and/or familiarity with a particular product
may override technical issues.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Desirable Properties of an HI compiler
• Much more than just “Validation”
•
•
•
•
•
•
Annex H support
Qualification
Optimization and other “switches”
Competence and availability of support
Runtime support for HI systems
Support for Object-Code Verification
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

What does the HRG Report have to say?
• Recommends validation of appropriate annexes
- almost certainly A, B, C, D, and H. Annex G
(Numerics) may also be applicable for some
systems.
• Does not recommend use of a subset compiler,
although recognizes that a compiler may have a
mode in which a particular subset is enforced.
– Main compiler algorithms should be unchanged in such a
mode.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

HRG Report (2)
• Evidence required from compiler vendor:
–
–
–
–
–
Quality Management System (e.g. ISO 9001)
Fault tracking and reporting system
History of faults reported, found, fixed etc.
Availability of test evidence
Access to known faults database
• A full audit of a compiler vendor may be called
for.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Annex H Support
• Pragma Normalize_Scalars
– Useful! Compilers should support this, but remember that
many scalar types do not have an invalid representation.
• Documentation of Implementation Decisions
– Yes. Demand this from compiler vendor. If they can’t or
won’t supply such information, then find out why not!
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Annex H Support (2)
• Pragma Reviewable.
– Useful in theory. Does anyone implement this other than to
“turn on debugging”?
• Pragma Inspection_Point
– Yes please. Is particularly useful in combination with
hardware-level debugging tools such as in-circuit emulation,
processor probes, and logic analysis.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Annex H Support (3)
• Pragma Restrictions
– Useful.
– Some runtime options (e.g. Ravenscar) imply a predefined
set of Restrictions defined by the compiler vendor.
– Better to use a coherent predefined set than to “roll your
own”
– Understand effect of each restriction on code-gen and
runtime strategies.
– Even in SPARK, some restrictions are still useful - e.g.
No_Implicit_Heap_Allocation, No_Floating_Point,
No_Fixed_Point etc.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Compiler Qualification
• “Qualification” (whatever that means) of a full
compiler is beyond reach.
• Pragmatic approaches:
– Avoidance of “difficult to compile” language features in HI
subset.
– In service history
– Choice of “most commonly used” options
– Access to faults history and database
– Verification and Validation
– Object code verification (last resort!)
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Optimization and other “switches”
• Was the compiler validated using the set of
“switches” that will be used in practice?
• Is the compiler fully supported using those
switches?
• Your choice must be (as with everything else…)
documented and justified.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Optimization and High-Integrity
• Optimization remains a difficult issue
• In the past (I.e. 5 - 10 years ago…):
– Optimizers were seen as “buggy” or unreliable.
– Performance improvement was not that great.
– “High Integrity implies No Optimization” became accepted
practice.
– This position is no longer appropriate in many cases!
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Optimization and High-Integrity (2)
• Today…
– Optimizers are far more reliable.
– Some optimization is very important in obtaining acceptable
performance from modern architectures.
– Appropriate optimizations: local improvements such as
CSE, register tracking, elimination of redundant loads and
stores etc.
– Inappropriate: Global restructuring, such as loop unrolling,
elimination of partial redundancies etc.
• Seek evidence from compiler vendor as to most
appropriate, widely used setting.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Support...
• Support is a crucial issue.
• High Integrity projects tend to “stretch”
compilers, so finding and resolving problems is
common.
• Try to foster a close relationship with compiler
support staff. Become friends with the
technical staff as well.
• You get what you pay for!
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Runtime Systems and High Integrity
• In delivering a high-integrity system, a run-time
library (RTL) must be verified to the same level
of assurance as the rest of the application.
• Most Ada compiler vendors have responded to
this need with various products:
– Ada83 - SMART, C-SMART (Alsys, TSP); VADSsc (Verdix,
Rational)
– Ada95 - ObjectAda Real-Time/Raven (Aonix); APEX MARK
(Rational); GMART, GSTART (GreenHills); GNAT-No-Runtime
(ACT)
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Certifiable runtime systems
• 3 Main approaches:
– “Small, Certifiable” runtime systems
– Ravenscar
– No Runtime
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

“Small, Certifiable” runtime systems
• Marketing goal: largely aimed at meeting the
requirements of DO-178B up to and including
level A systems.
• Technical goal: Elimination of language features
with an unacceptably large runtime impact. e.g.
tasking, heap allocation, exceptions, predefined
I/O etc.
• Examples: Aonix C-SMART and Rational
VADSsc for Ada83.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Ravenscar Profile
• A “profile” of tasking and other features in
Ada95 that is appropriate for high-integrity and
hard real-time systems.
• Technical goals:
– Particularly efficient, simple runtime system implementation
on a single processor target.
– Amenable to static timing and schedulability analysis.
• Examples: Aonix ObjectAda Real-Time/Raven.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

No Run Time
• A radical idea - eliminate all language features
which require any runtime library support.
• Advantages: no runtime implies no certification
of any COTS component.
• Example: ACT GNAT-No-Runtime (GNORT).
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Runtime options and development
• In all these runtime options, the Board Support
Package (BSP) remains.
• The BSP provides support for:
–
–
–
–
–
–
Download and startup
“Cold Boot” (I.e. from ROM)
Hardware-specific initialisation
Debugging (I.e. breakpoint, single step)
Coverage analysis
Some predefined, “simple” I/O
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Runtime options and development
• Another problem: traditional testing techniques
such as unit-test and coverage analysis may not
work on the BSP.
• In some projects, we have fielded 2 BSPs:
• A “Debug” BSP
– Supports all of the above functionality for any application.
• A “Strip” BSP
– Supports only the functionality that is required for the
delivery of a specific application only. (e.g. no debug, no I/O
etc.)
• Advantages of Strip BSP: easier (manual)
coverage analysis and testing, no “dead” code.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Runtime Systems and High Integrity Subsets
• Design goals and choices in developing an HI
runtime system largely intersect with those of
an HI language.
• SPARK was designed to require little or no
runtime library.
• It is no surprise, then, that SPARK is compatible
with all the products mentioned so far.
• Some expansion of SPARK (towards Ravenscar,
for example), is now possible.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Object Code Verification (OCV)
• In the absence of sufficient trust in a compiler,
manual verification of object code may be
required.
• Avoid this if at all possible!
• Requires detailed knowledge: of language, of
compiler, and of target processor.
• Very hard work!
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

OCV (2)
• A central problem is Traceability of source to
object code.
– Source code statements to object code instructions
– Source code declarations to memory layout
– See Annex LRM H.3.1
• Existing traditional support for debugging offers
a partial solution.
– Support could be better, but there is little call for
improvement from customers.
• Complex interaction with language subset and
optimization issues.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

OCV Techniques - 1 step
• Compare source code with disassembled object
code directly.
• Disadvantages:
– The “semantic gap” between the 2 is very wide (especially
for a rich language like Ada)
– Requires detailed knowledge of Ada compilation, code
generation, language issues, target architecture and so on.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

OCV Techniques - 2 step
• Step 1 - Review source against compilergenerated intermediate language (IL)
• Step 2 - Review IL against disassembled object
code.
• Advantages
– semantic gaps are narrower.
– Splits skills required.
• Disadvantages
– Not many compilers allow users access to IL.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

OCV Example
• One OCV exercise found a single nonsensical
code sequence in a program.
• Analysis by 3 different people could not
understand what was going on - was it a
compiler bug?
• No! Turned out to be a bug in the disassembler
(listing the wrong instruction for a certain opcode)
• No other problems found.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

The “No Surprises” rule
• My own personal rule-of-thumb for HI
programming.
• When programming, try to predict the generated
code, including timing and memory usage.
– Means you have to “know” the compiler and target pretty
well!
• The compiler should never surprise you.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

An example surprise...
• In the SHOLIS application software, there are
several large constant arrays:
My_Constant : constant Big_Type :=
Big_Type’( ... );
• Compiler is Alsys AdaWorld Ada83 targeting
68040. What code is generated?
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

An example surprise (2)
• The aggregate is not static in Ada83, so is
evaluated at run-time into a temporary variable.
• This temporary variable is larger than 1024
bytes, so compiler puts it on the heap!
declare
type Temp_Ptr is access Big_Type;
Temp : Temp_Ptr;
begin
Temp := RTS.Allocate_Memory(Big_Type’Size);
Temp.all := Big_Type’( ... );
My_Constant := Temp.all;
RTS.Free(Temp);
end;
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

An example surprise (3)
• Unfortunately, SMART runtime does not
implement Heap allocation…oh dear…a big
surprise!
• N.B. Things are much better in Ada95.
• Another rule of thumb: always have someone
on a project team who is capable of reading and
reviewing the object code.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Compiler and Runtime Resources
• See the compiler vendors!
• “Re-engineering a Safety-Critical Application
Using SPARK95 and GNORT” R. Chapman and
R. Dewar, in Reliable Software Technologies Ada-Europe 1999, Springer LNCS Vol. 1622.
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited

Programme
• Introduction
• What is High Integrity Software?
• Reliable Programming in Standard Languages
– Coffee
• Standards Overview
• DO178B and the Lockheed C130J
– Lunch
• Def Stan 00-55 and SHOLIS
• ITSEC, Common Criteria and Mondex
– Tea
• Compiler and Run-time Issues
• Conclusions
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
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Some properties of critical systems
• Building safe systems is not the same as
certification
– the goal is to build a demonstrably safe system
– a demonstrably safe system can be certified to any standard
• Showing a system is safe is invariably harder
than building a safe system
• Quality and safety cannot be retro-fitted
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
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A cost-effective approach:
• Requires a “correctness by construction”
approach
– build in safety from the start
– build in quality from the start
– bug prevention not bug detection
• The approach should be “verification driven”
– evidence of suitability should be produced as a side-effect
of the development process
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
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No magic
• There is no easy way, no magic wands and no
silver bullets
• Therefore we must deploy range of techniques
that attack all sources of risk and error
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–
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hazard analysis
requirements capture
specification
programming languages
code
analysis
test
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
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The Role of Ada
• Superficially Ada is not a good match to DO-178B
– source code to object mapping can be harder (e.g. run-time checks)
– run-time library overheads increase certification cost
• However, in practice
– the savings from better abstraction, better front-end checking etc.
greatly outweigh this extra cost
– the disadvantages can be eliminated by subsetting
– only Ada allows the construction of rigorous subsets
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
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A Model Process
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•
•
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Really understand the requirements
Really understand the hazards
Design a system to mitigate the hazards
Design software to preserve the mitigations
– specify it formally
– prove the specification has the required properties
• Code in an unambiguous language
– analyse the code before compilation
– ideally don’t give coders access to the compiler!
• Test, with emphasis on requirements based testing
– obtain test cases from requirements, hazard analysis and formal spec
– don’t waste time on blanket unit test
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
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A Model Team (An Opinion!)
• Small and not too hierarchical
• Integrated systems and software expertise
• Engineering expertise is more important than tool- or
language-specific knowledge
• But team should include:
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a domain specialist (someone who really understands what is being built)
a language/compiler guru
a mathematician
a quality/configuration management and documentation pedant
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
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A final word...
Better really can be cheaper!
Copyright © 2001 Praxis Critical Systems Limited
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Software and Safety: A Software Engineer's Perspective